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"Strong on the Merits and Powerfully Symbolic"
THE RETURN OF BLUE LAKE TO TAOS PUEBLO

Andrew Graybill

Introduction

B

e~een 188 7 and 1934, Native American communities in the United

States lost more than one hundred million acres ofland. ' Stripped of
aboriginal title to their ancestral areas, Indians across the country, but especially those in the West, could only watch as ranchers, state governments, and
federal agencies seized their treasured homes in the name of progress and
conservation. The Taos Indians of northern New Mexico proved to be no
exception, although they had lived in their adobe pueblo, one of the oldest
continually inhabited structures in North America, for more than five hundred years. z In November 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt signed a proclamation establishing the Taos Forest Reserve, a decision that withdrew
thousands of acres ofland from the Taos Reservation and placed it under the
control of the federal government, specifically the Forest Service. Roosevelt,
·an avid outdoorsman, was determined to protect America's vanishing wood-

Andrew R. Graybill is a Ph.D. candidate in history at Princeton University. He is currently at
work on his dissertation, a comparative study of the Texas Rangers and the North-West
Mounted Police between 1875-1910. For their assistance, the author would like to thank Professor James McPherson, Professor Andrew Isenberg, Stacy Curwood, Alec Dun,. Nick Guyatt,
John Hare, Malinda Lindquist, George Sarabia, James Turner, Jenny Weber, Chad Williams,
John Weeren, and the staff of Princeton's Mudd Manuscript Library.
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lands, and Gifford Pinchot, chief of the Forest Service, personally recommended the area around the Taos Pueblo to Roosevelt.
The Taos property that became part ofthe Carson National Forest in 1908
was immensely important to the fifteen hundred Indians living in the pueblo.
Generations of their ancestors had raised crops and grazed livestock on the
tall grasses that dotted the plateau, but more worrisome by far to the Indians
than the potential loss of agricultural territorywas the threat posed to Blue
Lake, the shrine most important to the practice of their religion. Located
high in the nearby Sangre de Cristo Mountains, Blue Lake stood at the center of the vast swath of real estate claimed by the United States government
in 1906. Convinced that federal management would lead inevitably to the
destruction of their open-air sanctuary and, in turn, the decline of the Taos
Indians themselves, the group began a sixty-four-year battle to reclaim the
area. Enlisting the support of several eastern philanthropic organizations,
most notably the Association on American Indian Affairs (MIA), the Taos
argued that only the return of the Blue Lake lands-and not monetary compensation, as was customary-would provide them adequate redress.
During the relatively quiet years in the struggle, between 1906 and 1945,
the Taos made regular but cautious appeals to the government, all of which
were rejected in part or in whole. The advent of MIA involvement in the
case in 1950 and the Indians' filing of a petition with the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) the following year, however, brought increased opposition
from federal and state governments during the 1950S and 1960s. Much of this
resistance emanated from the offices of New Mexico senator Clinton P. Anderson and the Department ofAgriculture. Both worried that a return ofland
to the pueblo would set a dangerous precedent and open the door for other
Indian groups to press for real estate settlements - ranging from land restitution to money. According to Anderson's estimates, such claims could apply
to more than ninety percent of United States territory. Nevertheless, in 1970
President Richard M. Nixon urged the Ninety-first Congress to pass a bill
transferring forty-eight thousand acres of the Blue Lake lands back to the
Taos, and on 15 December of that year, Nixon signed House Resolution
(H.R.) 471 into law, settling an Indian claim by awarding land rather than
cash for the first time in the history of United States-Indian relations. 3
Despite its landmark significance, however, the Blue Lake case languishes
in relative obscurity in the annals oftwentieth-century "success" stories involving Native Americans' struggles against the United States government. 4 More
famous, for instance, is the so-called Boldt Decision of 1974, which reinstated
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fishing privileges to the Swinomish Indians of the Pacific Northwest.' When
one considers that this restoration of usufruct (usage rights) is often cited as
perhaps the high-water mark ofIndian achievement in reclamation petitions
filed against the U.S. government, the Taos' victory in recovering direct ownership of their appropriated lands appears even more extraordinary. Thus, the
Blue Lake case raises the intriguing question: why did the Taos Indians enjoy such success while so many other Native American groups settled for
much less or failed outright in their bids to ~egain lands taken from them by .
the government?
An examination of the extensive MIA files on Blue Lake and the personal
papers of four individuals instrumental in the fight suggests two answers. 6
First, the Taos and their supporters distinguished the Taos' claim from other
reclamation cases by linking the possession of Blue Lake directly to the preservation of their religious freedom. Indeed, the Taos were the only Native
American group to file a land claim rooted almost exclusively in the protection of spiritual practices, as opposed to building an appeal based primarily
on legal or economic grounds. Second, in the five years immediately preceding the passage ofH.R. 471, the Taos and their advocates waged an aggressive
publicity campaign that, by the late 1960$, had made Blue Lake, in the words
of one Nixon staffer, "a national symbol to American Indians."i The combination of these two elements won the Pueblos the support of the Nixon Administration,which provided the political capital necessary for Congress to
override the objections of Senator Anderson and the Department ofAgriculture and return BIue Lake to the Taos.
Blue Lake, the Taos Indians, and the
United States, 1906-1946

Reviewing the opening years of the twentieth century helps explain how the
loss offorty-eight'thousand acres ofNew Mexico woodland and the cerulean
pool standing at its center could motivate the intensely private Taos to pursue a highly publicized and bitter struggle to regain it. At first glance, the
government's confiscation of the Blue Lake territory in 1906 did not seem
overly threatening to the Taos. In fact, Bert Phillips, Carson National Forest's
first ranger, believed that the appropriation of the tract would actually benefit the Taos by limiting non-Indian access to the area, and the first several
years following the creation of the preserve proved him right. Indeed, as
Phillips recalled years later, "I saw that there were good homestead sites in
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the Forest, but because of the Indians' prior use and the whole intention of
setting this area aside, I refused to give any permits to applicants anywhere in
the watershed."8
Concerned, however, thattheir exclusive use of Blue Lake and its surrounding lands might nevertheless be jeopardized, the Taos-with the assistance of
the Indian Affairs Office-tried twice to have the area designated as an executive order reservation for their pueblo, in 1914 and again in 19169 Both efforts
failed, and the Indians' fears were soon realized when Phillips's less sympathetic successor, Elliott Barker, began to issue grazing permits to non-Indians
in 1918.10 Even more troubling to Taos Pueblo was that Barker opened the area
to tourists by cutting extensive trails through the forest and stocked the watersincluding Blue Lake-with trout for recreational fishing. One historian has
written, "In the three short years of his superintendency, Barker personally
oversaw the destruction of the Indians' centuries-old exclusive-use rights."ll
The Taos' fortunes seemed to improve somewhat in 1924, however, with
the passage of the Pueblo Lands Act, a Congressional measure aimed at resolving the myriad Indian land-ownership problems in New Mexico. l2 The
Indians presented their case in 1926 to the Pueblo Lands Board, arguing that
the government owed significant compensatory payments for territory taken
from the Taos, including a sizable portion now occupied by the non-Iridian
town of Taos, three miles south of the pueblo village. The Indians, however,
offered to waive their rights to the township property if the board would grant
the pueblo ownership of the fifty thousand acres surrounding Blue Lake.
Incredibly, the board accepted the Indians' offer but then failed to include
this agreement in its subsequent report to Congress. Thus, the Taos had for~
feited nearly $300,000 and received absolutely nothing in return. 13
Disgruntled but unbowed, the Taos continued to push for an equitable
resolution to the problem of the Blue Lake lands. Another glimm~r of hope
appeared with John Collier's appointment as commissioner of Indian affairs
in 1933. Collier Was well respected among many Native Americans throughout the country for his work in protecting Indian rights and was renowned for
his strenuous opposition to assimilationist policies. No group enjoyed a better relationship with him than the Taos. Greatly inspired by his visit to the
pueblo in 1920, Collier later remarked that he felt as if he had discovered a
"red Atlantis," and he wanted at once to share it with the rest of the world but
also to ensure the survival of its cultural integrity.14 Thirteen years later, upon
assuming his post in President Franklin Roosevelt's administration, Collier
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sought to make good on the second half of that resolution, helping engineer
legislation that would restore control of at least some of the lost lands to the
Taos. Again, however, the Indians received far less than they had requested.
Submitted in 1933, the bill, H.R. 4014, provided the Taos with a fifty-year renewable exclusive-use permit but it applied to only three days a year (the end of
August during their annual religious trek to Blue Lake) and left the entire contested area under the ownership and direct control of the Forest Service.
The problem~ with Forest Service contr~l quickly became clear. During
the early 1940s, recreational lISe of the forest rose dramatically, as hunters,
fishermen, and campers arrived in growing numbers to enjoy the beauty and
sporting opportunities of northern New Mexico. Furthermore, non-Indian
ranchers grazed more animals on larger sections of the Taos' former land
than ever before, and the Department ofAgriculture even approved logging
operations in select parts of the preserve. I) By the middle of the decade, Taos
Pueblo's cause seemed lost, and its members watched with de'spair as their
holy sanctuary was subjected to constant violation.
"Our Ancient Way of Life": Taos Pueblo and the
Importance of Blue Lake

What made the return of Blue Lake so vitally important to the Taos? The
answer offered by one observer is succinct and poignant: "The Taos Indians
have always believed that the' waters of Blue Lake are the source of all life for
them."16 For an agricultural people such as the Taos, this answer was literally
true. Archaeological evidence suggests that the Indians used the area northeast of the pueblo for hunting and farming as early as A.D. 1350 -land made
arable by the waters of the Rio Pueblo de Taos, whose source was Blue Lake. 17
Moreover, beyon<1 irrigating nearby fields and attracting game, the stream
ran right through the settlement, providing the Taos with both water and a
constant reminder of their dependence on Blue Lake.
Of greater importance to the pueblo, however, was the pool's religious significance. Among the most conservative ofNorth American Indian groups, the
Taos clinged to their ancestral traditions perhaps more tenaciously than any.
other indigenous community in the United States, resisting conveniances of
modern life such as telephones, automobiles, and electricity. IS Lying at the
heart of this conservatism were their religious beliefs preserved largely intact
despite the Taos' three centuries of contact with Spaniards, Mexicans, and
. Anglos.
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One Taos Indian has described Pueblo religion as "a mosaic composed of
bits and pieces ofknowledge known only to a restricted number ofindividuals."
Very little Taos ritual, ceremony, or belief has been revealed to outside obserVers. 19 The community places much importance on its ceremonial calendarwhich includes ritual dances and rites of purification -and on the six all-male
kivas, underground ceremonial centers that initiate select boys between 'ages
seven and ten into the religious life of the community.10 Probably the most
essential ingredient of Taos religion, however, is the village's relationship to
nature. In a 1961 address to the MIA titled "Our Ancient Way of Life," Taos
Indian Severino Martinez noted, "we don't have gold temples ... but we have
a sign of a living God to who [sic] we pray- the living trees, the evergreen and
spruce and the beautiful flowers and the beautiful rocks.... We have this proof
of sacred things we deeply love, deeply believe."11 By all accounts, Blue Lake
stands literally and figuratively at the center of the Taos' cosmology; it is the
pueblo's most revered shrine and the site of an annual pilgrimage made by
every member ofthe community. Likewise, the lands surrounding the pool are
just as important, connected to Blue Lake by an intricate ecological and, the
Taos believe, spiritual web. ll
Thus, Forest Service management of the sacred territory posed a significant threat to the Taos, because the government allowed and even encour c
aged the incursions of strangers into the area. Not just the beer cans and
fishing lines polluting the waters of their "church," as the Indians regularly
referred to Blue Lake, caused them such anxiety, but more vexing for the
Taos was the loss of privacy that they deemed necessary to preserve their religion, the delicate threads from which the fabric of Taos society and its institutions were woven. One Taosefio noted in the 1930S, "our ways would lose
their power if they were known. People have learned the ways of the other
Pueblos, and those Pueblos have lost their power."13 Supporting this claim
years later, anthropologist John Bodine testified before Congress that if"Blue
Lake and the surrounding lands are not returned to the tribe it will effectively
destroy Taos culture."14 The Pueblos' struggle to recover the area, therefore,
was not just another land dispute between Native Americans and the United
States government. To the Taos, the fight was even more basic than thatit was a matter of cultural life or death.

The Indian Claims Commission and the MIA
Taos efforts to regain Blue Lake might have ended by midcentury were it not
for the advent of the Indian Claims Commission. Created in 1946 as a quasi-
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OLiVER LA FARGE, PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATiON ON

1937
(Photograph courtesy Library of Congress.)

AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS, IN

judicial branch of Congress, the ICC was a last-ditch attempt to adjudicate
long-standing Native American claims against the United States 25 Set to expire just five years later (although it was renewed numerous times before 1978
to deal with the volume of Indian petitions), the legislation governing the
ICC offered Indian groups a final opportunity to settle outstanding legal differences with the federal government. Wary in light of their past frustrations,
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the Taos believed nevertheless that the ICC might ultimately provide them
with the means to obtain a favorable decision regarding their sacred lands.
However, members of the Pueblo Council, the community's governing body,
felt that the Taos needed first to secure additional support to help them in their
fight. Fortunately, they had to look no farther than Santa Fe. Lying seventy
miles to the south\\;est, the city was the home of Oliver La Farge, president of
the Association on American Indian Affairs.
The MIA, formed in 1933 by the merger of the National Association on
Indian Affairs (formerly the Eastern Association on Indian Affairs) and the
American Indian Defense Association, assisted Native Americans in protecting their constitutional rights and working to improve their quality of life.
Like John Collier, L~ Farge, who began his second term as MIA president
in 1948, had a special relationship with the Taos, which began in earnest during a trip to the Southwest that he made on behalf of the Association in 1934As La Farge explained years later, he found the Taos unique among the indigenous groups that he had encountered in New Mexic'oand Arizona: "Few
other tribes have preserved so intact the beauty of the Indian way oflife. This
beauty shows in their rituals, in their costume, and in the people themselves-their physical appearance, their poise, and their humor."z6 By the
time a delegation from Taos approached him formally in 1950 to seek the
Association's help, La Farge had lived in Santa Fe for more than a decade and
had become a trusted friend to the Indians.
Scarred by more than thirty years of failed attempts to recover Blue Lake,
the Taos devised a different strategy for appealing to the ICC. This time, instead
ofseeking any mixture offinancial compensation and an expanded use permit,
they decided to push for fee title to fifty thousand acres ofland adjacent to the
pueblo. Such title would give the Taos, rather than the government, ownership
of the disputed areaY La Farge, however, advocated a much more cautious
proposal. As he explained to the Taos, the ICC was authorized to award only
monetary settlements-not territory-to Native American groups proving
their cases; .only an act of Congress could effect a land transfer. To the MIA
legal counsel, he explained, "I am firmly opposed to the idea of asking to have
any ofthese lands conveyed to Taos Pueblo under fee patent, and I believe that
an attempt to do so would be politically impracticable."zR In short, La Farge
believed that the government would never surrender its right to the land.
Proposing a more realistic solution, he urged the Pueblo Council first to
seek an airtight use permit for a vastly enlarged area of the Blue Lake lands
and second to reevaluate the situation. z'! The Taos had little choice but to
follow La Farge's directive, because the MIA president said that he would
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withhold organizational support of their cause if they insisted on pursuing
another route. His plan called for the introduction of a bill that would expand
the Jaos' use permit, while the pueblo's ICC petition -filed in August 1951was pending before the tribunal. In the event that the ICC returned a favorable decision, the Taos could then use such a verdict to leverage further
concessions from the government.
To be sure, the political climate surrounding Native American issues at
midcentury shaped La Farge's strategy to a considerable extent. Following the
Second World War, the "Congressional pendulum" swung back toward assimilation, as Republican lawmakers repudiated the self-determination policies that
Collier and the Roosevelt administration had advocated in the 193os.30 Seeking
to trim the perceived budgetary excesses of the New Deal. and to drive Indians
off reservations and into "mainstream" American society, legislators proposed
to end federal support to Native American communities. Termination, as this
policy came to be known, had catastrophic consequences for many Indian
people, as governmental relief for vital social services - including health care
and education-dried up practically overnight, exacerbating the already dire
poverty of groups such as the Menominees of Wisconsin and the Paiutes of
Nevada. 3!
Considering the growing legislative hostility toward Native Americans
during the 195os, La Farge wanted to avoid any sharp confrontations with
lawmakers, parti~ularly proassimilationists who would strenuously resist a
direct grant ofland to Indians -with its obvious anti-assimilationist implicationsY Moreover, in the early 195os, as MIA president, La Farge offered a
qualified endorsement of terminfltion, believing that the total integration of
Indians into greater United States society was all but inevitable anyway33 La
Farge clearly questioned the political viability of the Taos request for ownership of the Blue Lake lands, decidingin the end that a less radi~al use permit authorized at the government's discretion was a more feasible goal. Such
factors help explain the cautious nature ofthe Association's initial support for
the Indians' plight.
During the 1950S La Farge's correspondence underscores the MIA's circumspect approach toward the Taos case in the early years of its involvement.
For instance, the president-and theorganization-emphasized the legal dimensions of the petition instead of stressing the Taos' special religious concerns. In correspondence. with Congressional representatives and federal
officials, La Farge cast the Indians' cause in the more established terms of
Native American claims disputes, focusing on governmental injustice and the
righting of old wrongs. For instance, in a memorandum to Senator Anderson,
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La Farge wrote, "What I have seen of the evidence now in the hands of the
Pueblo's attorneys definitely shows that Taos has a strong case. Justice demands that this case be heard."J4 A petition filed by the pueblo (but probably
written by La Farge) in 1955 captured the spirit of the MIA's initial strategy:
the legal argument focused almost entirely on the Taos' continual occupation of the land, Spanish and Mexican recognition of their property rights
through 1848, and the questionable actions of the federal government in 1906
and afterwards. J5 Yet the petition only made passing mention of Blue Lake's
religious significance to the Taos.
Over the next few years, however, La Farge changed his mind and shifted
the MIA strategy with respect to the Taos' claim. First, research by MIA
lawyers preparing for the ICC hearing turned up additional evidence that the
government had used legal trickery to hinder the Taos' case. Particularly disturbing to La Farge was the revelation that the Department of Agriculture
had modified the wording of a 1933 ruling on Blue Lake by the Senate Indian
Affairs Committee. Originally giving the Taos exclusive use, that decision
had later been narrowed to read "exclusive use during religious ceremonials
for such limited periods as may be agreed upon by their representatives and

the Supervisor of the Carson National Forest. The public may be admitted at
other times" (emphasis added).Jfi In 1940 the Department ofAgriculture curtailed these privileges even further by again altering the use permit, this time
to limit the Taos' rights of exclusivity to just three days a year. 37 La Farge,
moreover, had abandoned any terminationist leanings he may have harbored
in light of his discouraging dealings with Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Dillon S. Myer and his successor, Glenn Emmons. J8
_Second and more important, though, wasLa Farge's deepened understanding of the profound religious significance of Blue Lake to the Indian~. Several
times, the Pueblo Council made small monetary contributions to the Association, which La Farge interpreted as thanks for the MIA's support in the struggle.wMoreover, in the course of several meetings, the sincerity and tenacity of
the community's elders impressed La Farge. Recalling one such encounter, La
Farge wrote Executive Director La Verne Madigan of the MIA:
They [the Indians] then restated the vital importance to Taos Pueblo
of the Blue Lake Area.... They reminded me that the whole pattern
of Taos life that they are maintaining depends on their religion, and
their religion in turn depends on their sacred area. Their earnestness
and intensity when they discuss this matter is extremely moving.
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Later in the same note, La Farge explained that he felt "under considerable
obligation to try and get results for this Pueblo." Afterward he lapsed into a
short but impassioned recapitulation'ofthe government's actions in defrauding the Taos. 40
By 1963, La Farge accepted the Indians' conviction that only Taos ownership
ofthe landwould meet the tribe's needs, although he persuaded them that title
. in trust, rather than fee, was both better for the Indians (land held in trust by
the government carried with it no tax obligations for the owner) and more practical. 41 In addition, the Forest Service's increasing issuance of recreational use
and grazing permits to non-Indians-without stipulated Pueblo consentcoupled with growing talk of timber harvesting near the lake, persuaded La
Farge that the government and the Indians could not "share" the area. In a
letter written only days before his death in August 1963, La Farge explained to
John Collier, "In the course ofthe past thirteen years a number ofoccurrences
have led me to conclude that the Indians are right in desiring outright title. I
am sure it is even less of a surprise to you than it is to me when one finds that
a group ofIndians is a better judge of its own affairs than we are."42
Just as La Farge changed his mind about seeking title for the territory, so
too did he adjust the MIA's strategy for attaining the Indians' goals. In the
1950S the Association had argued the Taos' case like any number of other
Native American claims disputes, but in the 1960s the MIA pursued a different plan of attack. Perhaps invigorated by La Farge's own realization that
religion was important to the pueblo; the Association's attorneys began to
stress this aspect of the petition. For instance, in 1961 MIA counsel wrote
Secretary ofthe Interior Stewart Udall: "Under the administration ofthe Forest Service the use of this area for hunting, fishing and camping has steadily
increased to the point that the religious feelings of the Pueblo are severely
affronted. The only solution is the total exclusion of non-Indians from the
area."43 Elsewhere, chiefMIA lawyer Richard Schifter explained to a Department of Agriculture official, "The Taos Indians are unique ... in the degree
to which they have retained their ancient ways and to the extent that they
focus their religious interests and practices on natural shrines."44
Appeals such as these marked the substance ofMIA contributions to the
Blue Lake fight in the years immediately following La Farge's death. Convinced that the success or failure of the Taos Pueblo's case hinged on the
ability ofthe Indians and their advocates to capitalize on the pueblo's exceptionalism, the Association plotted a new course of action. This strategy emphasized features of the Taos' suit that would distinguish their case from other
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claims. Especially important was linking Taos Pueblo ownership of Blue
Lake to the protection of its people's freedom of religion. Moreover, MIA
leadership recognized the need to take the fight from northern New Mexico
and Washington, D.C., to the rest of the country.
A New Approach: "The Blue Lake Appeal" and S. 3085

The growth ofIndian activism in the early 1960$ undoubtedly influenced the
Association's decision to raise national awareness of the Taos case. Inspired
by the anxieties and disappointments of the termination era's "barren years,"
young, college-educated Indians renewed the push for self-determination,
rejecting the "Uncle Tomahawks" in their communities who favored mediation with the federal government on terms set by the United States. 45 Against
the larger backdrop of the Civil Rights movement (which Indians avoided
but from which they clearly benefited), several highly publicized events in
the first half of the decade drew attention to the political struggles of Native
Americans. 46 Chief among these protests was a series of "fish-ins" staged in
the spring of 1964 in the Pacific Northwest. These demonstrations-attended
by such well-known figures as Marlon Brando and Jane Fonda-protested
the government's abrogation of fishing privileges guaranteed by treaty to several groups of Indians in Washington state. 47 In addition to the handful of
nationally prominent individuals, more than one thousand Indians from fiftysix tribes - ranging from Florida Seminoles to Michigan Potowatomis - traveled to Washington state in support of the embattled Yakima, Muckleshoot,
Puyallup, and Nisqually Indians, heralding the arrival of a nationwide movement for Native American rights. 48
Although the Taos Indians and the MIA must have been aware of these
developments, neither the pueblo nor its advocates consciously linked the
Blue Lake recovery effort to such events. 49 Two factors may help to explain
this surprising circumstance. First, the most important figures in early 1960s
Native American activism were younger, urban Indians who had lived off the
reservation for years and belonged to pan-Indian political organizations such
as the National Indian Youth Council. The Taos, on the other hand, were
among the most conservative Indian groups in the country, and they were
dominated by elders who resolved not to compromise traditional values in
pursuit of any goals, even political ones such as the repossession of Blue
Lake m Thus, the pueblo was unlikely to seek the support of young, non-Taos
political radicals in their fight. Moreover, because the MIA repeatedly em-
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phasized the unique nature of the Taos petition, any attempt to incorporate
the struggle for Blue Lake within the larger movement for Indian civil rights
threatened to remove the linchpin of exceptional ism, making this "just another Indian claims case."
Regardless of its relative nonparticipation in the Indian activism of the early
1960s, the MIA sought nevertheless to capitalize on the heightened national
awareness aroused by the "fish-ins" and other such protest events. Nowhere was
this commitment to an aggressive public relations campaign more evident than
in the Association's publication of The Blue Lake Appeal, an eight-page brochure that appeared in 1965. Planning for this booklet began shortly after La
Farge's death and represented new Executive Director William Byler's resolve
to step up efforts to recover the territory. Speaking at a Taos Pueblo Council
meeting in September 1964, Byler explained that the recruitment of churches
and Congressional members was essential to their cause, a suggestion that
resonated with Corinne Locker, the field secretary in the MIA's southwest
office and former assistant to La Farge. 51
Described as "something of a public relations genius," Locker quickly
conceived the idea ofpublishing a short, hard-hitting pamphlet that could be
sent to newspapers, politicians, churches, and foundations all over the country in an attempt to generate national support for the Indians. 52 In early 1965
Locker carefully plotted with Byler the MIA's plan for the circular: "Three
major areas should receive emphasis: religion, conservation, and legality.
The most telling will be the religious.... First part: 30-year struggle to regain
possession of holy sanctuary - perhaps phrased in such a way as to suggest
Bethlehem."53 As this blueprint indicates, ~hile Locker and Byler retained
the traditional legal arguments in favor of the Taos and added information on
the Indians' commitment to environmental preservation, the heart of the
publication would be the appeal to religious liberty.54
Plans for the brochure received a major boost on 8 September 1965; when
the Indian Claims Commission released its judgment on the Taos' case,
more than fourteen years after the Indians and the ~IA had filed suit. The
court ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the pueblo, finding not only that the
United States had illegally extinguished the Taos' aboriginal title to the land
in 1906, but also that the government had cheated the Indians out of more
than $300,000 in compensation. On these grounds, the commission issued
an interlocutory order for a reassessment of the territory's worth, followed by
the payment of an appropriate indemnity. Although pleased with the findings, the Indians declined to accept a financial settlement, planning as before
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to use the ruling as leverage to win title to the land. 55 The MIA, meanwhile,
printed excerpts from the decision in the centerfold of the pamphlet, along
with striking pictures ofBlue Lake, the pueblo buildings, and members of the
community. Brimming with confidence, the Association mailed several
hundred copies of the brochure, Blue Lake Appeal, to newspapers, churches,
foundations, and other people and organizations in the fall of 1965.
The results were quick and impressive. Newspapers across the country
printed editorials supporting Taos Pueblo, with virtually all commentators
emphasizing the religious aspects of the Taos' case. A column in the Minneapolis Tribune, for instance, captured just the sentiment for which Locker
and Byler had hoped. Opening with a passage about the Red Deer Dance,
one of the group's annual rituals, the author explained:
These secret and sacred rites that bring the Taos Pueblo Indians to a
unity with nature are practiced today with little change from the ways
of centuries gone by.... Diversity in our midst-whether it be that of
the Taos Indians and their sacred lake, or that of any other American
cultural group - is an asset to be cherished. 56
Elsewhere, the New York Times urged that Congress enact legislation returning Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo, calling the government's actions of 1906 and
afterwards "a historic injustice."57
The MIA, however, did not limit its public relations work to the publication and dissemination of The Blue Lake Appeal. About the same time that the
pamphlet was distributed, the Association called on its members to begin a
letter-writing campaign aimed at legislators in preparation for the introduction
of a bill on Taos Pueblo's behalfthe following spring. MIA members sent hundreds of notes-some strongly worded -to Capitol Hill and the White House,
and again the results were overwhelming. 58 One woman wrote her <=ongressional representative and afterwards dropped a line to Byler, explaining why
she had been happy to. take up the Taos' cause: "My family has had the opportunity to come and have some knowledge of the people of Taos Pueblo. We
admire their independence and the vitality of their culture."59
These developments helped nudge New Mexico senator Clinton P. Anderson to introduce Senate Bill 3085 in March 1966. For more than a decade,
MIA officials had been in regular contact with Anderson, a Democrat,
former secretary of agriculture, and one of the Senate's most powerful members. Given his standing, the Taos and the Association deemed Anderson's
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(Photograph, Clinton P. Anderson Papers, courtesy Center for Southwest Research,
Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.)

support crucial; securing it, however, was another matter, because Anderson
had close ties to large timber and mining interests in New Mexico, industries
that stood to lose valuable extractive opportunities if the Indians were to own
the Blue Lake lands outright. Perhaps bowing to ten years of MIA lobbying
efforts, Anderson finally proposed a bill that would grant nearly fifty thousand
acres to the Taos, although he did so "by request," a congressional convention
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"often denoting lukewarm support of, if not actual opposition to, the stated
legislation."6o As explained by William C. Schaab, an attorney who joined the
Indians' fight in 1968, Anderson saw this proposal as "a way to set-up a [monetary] settlement and get rid ofthe issue."6l At the same time, Florida congressman James Haley, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs,
introduced H.R. 15184 as a companion bill to Anderson's legislation.
If indeed the senator intended to "get rid ofthe issue," he succeeded in the
short run, helping to kill the measure in the Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee before it could reach the Senate floor for debate. That spring the
hearings on the proposed legislation, however, served remarkably well to
promote the MIA's strategy of focusing increased attention on the Taos'
dilemma, with special emphasis on their unique religious needs. Of critical
importance was the flood of support from church organizations and officials.
In Byler's opinion, religious associations were one of the two groups- along
with members of Congress-whose backing was pivotal. 61 Particularly gratifying to the Taos Pueblo and its advocates was the strong endorsement of the
National Council of Churches (NCC) represented at the hearings by the
Rev. Serge Hummon. His eloquent testimony on the Indians' behalf equated
Blue Lake with "cathedrals, mosques, and temples," describing it as a structure "of singular sanctity and significance." He then went on to note that,
"There is significant merit in the tribe's claim of property rights ... but to it
is added an additional, and in some respects weightier, argument: that the
lake is essential to the religious life of the tribe...."63 Such support from a
nationally'respected and "main-line" religious organization helped translate
the Taos' claims into terms that would appeal to a larger American public,
one hopefully concerned with the First Amendment guaraatee of religious
liberty.64
Although Anderson did not openly oppose S. 3085 in the subcommittee
hearings-to do so would have been unthinkable, as he had, after all, authored
the legislation in the first place - he made his uneasy feelings known to other
senators. Indeed, his queries to the Indians and their counsel, while polite,
betrayed his loyalty to both the timber industry and the Forest Service, a branch
of the Department ofAgriculture that Anderson headed in the 1940S.65 He expressed his strongest objection through others, particularly Louis S. Clapper of
the National Wildlife Federation. While Clapper articulated several reasons
that a congressional return of the land would be unwise, he focused his arguments on the adverse precedent that an award of real estate instead of money
to an Indian community would set. 66 Indeed, Clapper conjured for the sub-
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committee a future scenario in which formerly public lands would become offlimits to all but the Indians who claimed them and the country's wildlife would
become endangered from a lack of federal oversight. 67
Such charges might have gone unchecked had not a surprising source, a
high-ranking government official, stepped in to deliver expert testimony.68 In
his appearance before the subcommittee, Secretary of the Interior Stewart
Udall challenged this question of precedent and made the strongest case yet
for the exceptional ism of the Taos' claim. He explained:
Three main arguments have been expressed against enactment of this
bill. Foremost is that a precedent will be set and that other Indian
tribes will want lands rather than money from the Indian Claims
Commission. We do not share this concern. In many cases, the lands
for which tribes are compensated are not in the proximity of their
present holdings. Few of the tribes have expressed any such desire [for
land instead of money]. We would not consider a grant ofland in this
case as opening the door for favorable action on similar future requests.
In our view, the religious significance of this land to the Taos Pueblo
Indians warrants favorable action as an exception to the general rule. 69
No other witness that spring did more than Udall to legitimate the Taos' petition, counter the opposition's objections, and distinguish the Pueblos' case
from all other Indian suits against the government. 71l Indeed, Udall's testimony-whether inadvertently or by design-confirmed and strengthened
the MIA's strategy to recover Blue Lake by reinforcing the group's unique
religious needs in a very public forum. Still more support along these lines
carne from a host ofIndian communities, whose letters echoed Udall's assertions about the Taos' unusually strong relationship to the land.'1
The death knell for S. 3085 sounded with Anderson's announcement on
12 July 1966 that he had developed plans for a new bill that would give the
Indians only 3,100 acres ofland in trust title, with a use permit for the rest.
This plan was unacceptable to the Indians, and with both sides unwilling to
budge, S. 3085 died in committee, Qrphaned by Anderson and opposed by
the Department of Agriculture 72 Moreover, the House buried H.R. 15184whose passage was already unlikely, given Anderson's inevitable opposition,
should it ever reach the Senate -at the bottom of its agenda, where the resolution expired bef~)[e recejving consideration. The death ofboth bills- but
especially S. 3085 ~ in the summer of 1966 was bitterly disappointing to the
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Taos and the MIA. They had won a favorable decision from the ICC and
secured the introduction of legislation in Congress, only to watch it wither
on the vine. The Indians and their advocates could take some solace, however, in the knowledge that their case drew national attention to the issue and
attracted support from numerous prominent organizations and individuals.
They resolved to continue the fight, to reject any monetary offers, and to
pursue title to the fifty thousand acres surrounding Blue Lake.

New Advocates, Familiar Tactics
Particularly active in the wake of S. 3085's defeat was Dean Kelley, director
of the NCe's Commission on Religious Liberty. Convinced that still more
national publicity was needed in an effort to overcome opposition to Blue
Lake, Kelley asked Paul Bernal, general interpreter for the Pueblo Council
. and the Taos' chief liaison to the MIA, "Do you think it would be useful to
try to arrange for several religious leaders to make a 'pilgrimage' up to Blue
Lake to focus national attention on your claim, or would this seem too much
like 'grand standing'?"7l As it turned out, no such dramatization was necessary, as ABC Television proposed less than a month later to film a special
program on the case, as part ofthe network's Directions series on culture and
religion. 'The Sacred Lake ofTaos" aired that November, bringing the Taos'
story to countless homes across the country.
Kelley's other ideas included publishing an article that focused on the
government's impairment of the Taos' religious liberty. Late that spring, A
Journal ofChurch and State ran the piece, in which Kelley attacked the opposition to S. 3085 and singled out Anderson for special criticism. In addition
to his concerns over precedent and lost timber, Anderson had also questioned the Pueblos' need for such a large "church," arguing, "If they [the
Taos] refuse to take a 3,15o-acre tract and maintain it as sacred, we are bound
to have some doubts of their religious sentiment."74 Firing back in the editorial, Kelley wrote, "The relationship between the tribe and the land is an
organic one; they feel that the entire watershed is integral to the life of the
tribe .... If the trees are cut, the tribe bleeds. If the springs or lakes or streams
are polluted, the lifestream of the tribe is infected."75 Such sentiments, expressed by a religious leader in a national journal were weighty and convincing. Byler, for example, noting the critical importance of the NCC's
endorsement, explained, "I anticipated the skepticism with which the Congress would view such a claim if asserted by the Pueblo alone, without the
support of nationally recognized religious groupS."76
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Any momentum that these efforts might have built in preparation for the
next session of Congress, however, evaporated in the winter of 1966-1967.
Corinne Locker, perhaps the most dedicated and trusted of the Taos' nonIndian advocates, filed a censorious report with the MIA's top officials in late
November. Titled "The Association and the Taos Blue Lake," the meticulous
thirty-five-page memorandum charged that MIA attorneys on the case had
impeded the Indians' efforts to recover the area because of a serious conflict
of interest. In essence, Locker argued that lawyer Richard Schifter - who had
worked on the claim since the advent of the MIA's involvement-and his
associates began pushing for the Indians to accept an extended use permit,
along with the monetary compensation promised by the ICC when Anderson's opposition became clear. The legal counsel then believed that winning
title to any sizable tract ofland was next to impossible. Locker explained that
such a settlement was attractive to Schifter and his partners because it meant
they would finally be paid-handsomely-for their legal work on behalf of
the Pueblo. 77
Schifter and his associates vigorously contested Locker's report and soon
won the backing of Byler and eventually MIA President Alden Stevens, who
requested -and received - Locker's resignation in February 1967.78 This set
off a dizzying chain of events. Believing that their fiercest advocate had been
unjustly deposed, the Taos were furious. With the help ofConsuelo La Farge,
widow ofthe former MIA president, the Indians petitioned the Association's
Board of Directors to reinstate Locker, which they did later that month after
. Paul Bernal and a Pueblo Council delegation delivered an impassioned plea
at the MIA headquarters in Manhattan. With Locker back at work in Santa
Fe, order seemed restored to the Association and its plans for the Taos' case.
This "uneasy peace" lasted barely two months, splintering in April 1967
when Anderson introduced new legislation on Blue Lake, this time in earnest. Trying to bring the issue to a speedy resolution, Anderson proposed two
bills inimical to the Indians' wishes, although he claimed to have their best
interests at heart. 79 Both S. 1624 and S. 1625 provided for the return of only the
3,150 acres immediately surrounding Blue Lake-S. 1624 in fee title, S. 1625
in trust-with a permit for the use of an additional 29,000 acres. Such terms
would not prevent logging or unlicensed recreationaluse by non-Indians and
gave the Taos Pqeblo only a "small island" of territory with no explicit provision for access. Locker believed that the timing of Anderson's announcement was calculated to force the MIA's Board of Directors into accepting
this "compromise" at its annual meeting. An enraged Locker sent a telegram
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to board members, explaining that the vulnerability Anderson perceived in
the Association was the result of "an unholy alliance" between the attorneys
and head MIA officials. 8o Less than one week later, a bitterly divided board
voted to dismiss her.
The Taos responded quickly, informing the Association that the pueblo
chose to retain Locker and its regional attorney, Rufus G. Poole, and would
seek legal and public relations assistance from a source other than the MIA.
For its part, the Association dispatched board member Hildegarde Forbes to
Taos Pueblo to assess the situation. There she learned that the Taos - on
Locker's advice-had enlisted the National Council of Churches to replace
the MIA as their chief advocate. After a friendly conference with the Pueblo
Council, Forbes reported, rather smugly, to the board that her meeting had
smoothed any differences between the MIA and the Indians, so that "when
the NCC has become tired of this job, and if Mrs. Locker should fall by the
wayside, the Pueblo can then come back to the Association and ask for help
without loss of face."81 Privately, Forbes expressed relief that the MIA was
finally rid of the case, because the Association had "spent too much time,
energy and money tilting at windmills in the past year."82 Schifter underscored Forbes's characterization of the Taos' case as quixotic, explaining to
Byler that he gave the Indians no chance to secure title to the fifty thousand
acres over Anderson's objection. 83
Kelley and Locker were far more sanguine, however, and picked up
where the MIA had left off shortly before the controversy began. Fueling
their optimism was Florida congressman James Haley, who had responded
to Anderson's recent Senate bills with legislation of his own. Although it is
difficult to ascertain the source of Haley's loyalty to the Taos, one historian
has guessed that the congressman "thought the cause just and also seized an
opportunity to playa little political one-upmanship with Senator Anderson."84 Whatever his reasons, Haley's proposal, H.R. 3306, would return all
50,000 acres in trust to the Taos Indians, instead of the 3,150 acres recommended by the senator. With all three bills pending before their respective
committees, Kelley and Locker followed the same strategy - building a heavy
publicity campaign around the Taos' fight for religious freedom-that had
seemed to work so well in the winter of 1965 and spring of 1966. The enduring appeal of this plan to the tribe's advocates was soon justified, as the New
Mexico Council of Churches (NMCC)-which had avoided the i~sue in
1966-passed a resolution in November 1967 strongly supporting Haley's bill.
The NMCC based its endorsement on the fact that "Taos Pueblo's historical
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and religious claim to this land is overwhelmingly supported by the testimony
of the Indians themselves, the judicial findings of the ICC, the testimony of
expert witnesses, historians, anthropologists and religious authorities...."85
Clearly, an approach focusing on the spiritual plight of the Indians still had
political currency.
With hearings on the proposals of Anderson and Haley not scheduled to
begin until the following spring, Locker did what she could to keep the issue
alive in the public's mind. Undoubtedly, her most valuable contribution during this period, and probably in the entire campaign, was to oversee the formation of the National Committee for the Restoration of the Blue Lake
Lands to the Taos Indians. The project began in a 1967 conversation between
Locker and Consuelo La Farge about the need to attract other prominent
individuals to the Taos cause and raise money for their mounting legal bills.
Debuting in February 1968, the National Committee boasted a membership
list that read like a "who's who': ofAmerican religious, political, and business
leaders. Among others, the.list included Grace Collier (the former BIA commisioner's widow), department store executive John Wanamaker, writer Paul
Horgan, former interior secretary Stewart Udall, and Adlai Stevenson III.86
Like all efforts on behalf of the Taos at this time, the committee placed great
emphasis on the religious rights of the pueblo, as a letter from Kelley to
Locker reveals: "We have today distributed to the daily newspaper press and
a heavy list of religious periodicals ... your press release announcing the
Committee, as revised with a strengthened religious angle."87
Subcommittee hearings on H.R. 3306 opened on 9 May 1968. In preparation for the hearing, attorney William C. Schaab, serving in lieu of the
severely ill Rufus Poole, scheduled an impressive slate of witnesses and
drafted a comprehensive memorandum for distribution. In the memo,
Schaab penned the strongest words yet written on the matter, stressing the
importance of Blue Lake to the Taos' religion and their very survival, but he
added a qualification clearly aimed at Anderson: "Because of the essential
secrecy of its religion it has been difficult for the Pueblo to explain in terms
satisfactory to the American mind why it must control the entire watershed
of the Rio Pueblo."88 Kelley worried that this strategy might isolate some of
the Indians' supporters, but Schaab explained, "In my judgment, the secrecy
argument explains one of the sources of the religious significance ofthe Blue
Lake Area and also why the Indians have never been able to make a disclosure of their religious practices."89 The lawyer's words were prescient. Udall
and other witnesses used this rationale to bolster their case for the "singular"
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nature of the Taos' claim. In fact, so successful was Schaab's plan that, when
the bill finally emerged from the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs for the full
House vote, it passed unanimously. However, Anderson frustrated the Taos
Pueblo by killing the measure for a second time in the Senate.
But Haley was not easily deterred and promptly reintroduced the bill as H.R.

471 several months later on the first day of the new congressional session. Not
to be outdone, Anderson countered with S. 750, which would grant Taos
Pueblo exclusive use (not even title) to only 1,64° acres. As one historian has
noted, "Where each successive Haley bill was essentially identical to the previous proposal, each new Anderson proposal offered the tribe less and less
land."90 Although the senator suffered under the weight of increasingly negative public opinion, he remained steadfast in his opposition and made clear
that, if the Indians would not accept the "compromise" ofS. 750, there would
be no further legislative proposals from him. 91 The Taos response sharply criticized Anderson and flatly rejected his offer. 91 Meanwhile, debate on H.R. 471
began in May, passing the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs in June before winning the endorsement of the full House in September.
Richard Nixon and the Return of Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo

Sensing that their window of opportunity might be closing, the Taos and their
advocates decided that, if the Taos were ever going to recover Blue Lake, they
needed to enlist additional political support that would embolden senators
to vote for a measure benefiting a New Mexico people opposed by the state's
own representative, the powerful Senator Anderson. Fortunately for the Taos,
a bit of "Hemingway luck" -as Corinne Locker called it-came their way
later that year. 93 In the fall of 1969, Barbara "Bobbie" Greene, a Yale-trained
lawyer with a profound interest in Indian education, began serving a White
House fellowship under Richard Nixon. Nixon's domestic affairs advisor,
John Ehrlichman, recruited Greene to assist with the administration's Native
American policy. Greene soon began work on the Blue Lake case, which had
been brought to her attention by the wife of Oklahoma senator Fred Harris. 94
A second stroke of luck for the Taos occurred in January 1970, when the
National Congress of American Indians announced at its annual meeting
that it would make Taos Pueblo's fight to regain Blue Lake its top legislative
priority for the year. Still more support came later that month when the National Council on Indian Opportunity released during a White House meeting a report stating, "Because the [pueblo's] problem is unique and because
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it has persisted over so many decades, we feel that the Taos struggle merits the
special attention of the Council."95 Evidently, the report made quite an impression on Nixon's vice president, Spiro T. Agnew, and the cabinet members in attendance, because Agnew ordered his staff to prepare background
information on the case.
Believing that "dealings with the White House had reached a critical
juncture," Taos Pueblo dispatched a delegation, including Locker, Schaab,
and Paul Bernal, to meet with administration officials at a conference arranged for the Indians by Greene. 96 In the wake of the meeting, the White
House fellow was convinced not only that the Taos cause was just but that it
represented a pivotal political opportunity for the Nixon Administration.
Writing to a staff member in the office of Presidential Counselor Leonard
Garment, Greene remarked:
I cannot stress enough the serious need to get this thing moving. Blue
Lake has become a national symbol to American Indians and its
significance is 'felt by those who are urban residents as well as those
who live on reservations. If we cannot deliver on this equitable and
legal claim, we will be creating a breach with the Indian community
that perhaps will be irreparable .... The Taos Pueblo Indians are
committed to the House passed bill [H.R. 471] and tl1e Indian
population as a whole strongly supports them. Furthermore, they have
generated a great deal of active sympathy among non-Indians 97
Likewise convinced by the Taos claim to Blue Lake, Agnew wrote Nixon in
late March, "After having reviewed the situation, it is my conclusion that the
equities lie with the Taos Pueblo Indians and that we should endorse H.R.
471 ... and should aggressively seek its enactment."98 Concerned less with
justice than political calculus, Garment advised Nixon that the Blue Lake
case "has snowballed and is now the single specific Indian issue.... A new
Indian policy needs a starting point. Blue Lake is just that-strong on the
merits, and powerfully symbolic."99
Beyond its emblematic significance, however, one other consideration
made Blue Lake an attractive issue for the Nixon Administration: politically
speaking, it was relatively safe. By the time Garment and other presidential
advisors were acquainted with the Taos' petition in 1969, the Indian activism
that began in the early 1960s had become increasingly militant. This "Red
Power" movement stood for the "right ofIndians to be free of colonialist rule
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and to run their own affairs."loo Like the protest actions earlier in the decade,
Red Power sought to focus national attention on such concerns as the government's shameless abrogation ofIndian hunting and fishing privileges and
the difficult socioeconomic conditions on the reservation. However, frustrated by continued federal indifference, Red Power activists adopted more
aggressive tactics at decade's end.
No group played a larger role in building and sustaining Red Power than
the American Indian Movement (AIM), which was formed in Minneapolis
in 1968. Although AIM spent much of its first year concerned with employment and educational issues, the group quickly adopted a more militant
stance, seen in its establishment of a camp in 1970 at the base of Mount Rushmore, meant to symbolize Lakota claims to the Black Hills. Moreover, AIM
inspired a generation of young activists such as the group calling itself "Indians of All Tribes," who in November 1969 seized the defunct federal penitentiary on Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay, demanding that the
government step up its assistance programs in Native American communities. Despite the government's attempts to dislodge them, the Indians managed to. hold Alcatraz until June 1971. 101
The White House learned of the Blue Lake case during the widely publicized Alcatraz occupation. Eager to appear responsive to Indian concerns but
hesitant to give in to radicals, Nixon saw in Taos Pueblo's suit a wonderful opportunity to galvanize support for his new policy ofIndian self-determination
without polarizing his conservative constituent base. 'o2 With such considerations in mind, Nixon made Blue Lake the focal point of a speech, delivered
on 8 July 1970, in which he noted, "For 64 years, the Taos Pueblo has been
trying to regain possession of this sacred lake and watershed area ... [the Taos]
consider such action essential to the protection and expression oftheir religious
faith .... I therefore take this opportunity wholeheartedly to endorse legislation
which would restore 48,000 acres of sacred land to the Taos Pueblo people."IOJ
The timing ofthis announcement was hardly coincidental: Senate hearings on
H.R. 471 were set to begin the following day, and Nixon was sending word to
its members that he wanted the bill passed.
Nixon got his wish. Now faced with the Nixon Administration's backing
of the Blue Lake initiative (which helped dissolve the Department of Agriculture's strident opposition), Senator Anderson saw that the tide had turned
permanently against him. He did not go down easily, however, introducing
amendments to the bill-even after it had passed the subcommittee-that
would have stripped pueblo control of the lands and undermined its water
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rights. The White House countered these moves with increased support, including a letter-writing campaign organized by Garment's office and aimed
at winning over any undecided senators. As its author explained, the Taos
case was "the only instance of a [Native American] claim for land, which
once restored, would not be subject to commercial development, but could
only be used for traditional and religious purposes."I04 Such appeals eroded
what was left of Anderson's support, and finally, on 2 December 1970, the
Senate voted 70 to 12 in favor of H.R. 471.
Thirteen days later, Juan de Jesus Romero, the cacique (spiritual leader)
of the Taos, led an Indian delegation to the White House for the bill-signing
ceremony. Present, too, were Corinne Locker and Paul Bernal, the two people most responsible for the Taos' victory. After greeting Romero, Nixon delivered a shortspeech that confirmed just how successful the strategy adopted
in the 1960s had been and that must have been especially gratifying to Locker
and Bernal among many others who had supported the Indians during the
course of their fight. After noting that the bill represented "justice," Nixon
went on to distinguish the Taos case from all others on the same religious
basis as had the MIA, the NCC, and a host of dedicated individuals: "Long
before any organized reli&ion came to the United States, for 700 years the
Taos Pueblo Indians worshipped in this place. We restore this place of worship to them for all the years to come."ID5 Whatever else Blue Lake and the
lands surrounding it might have meant to the Taos, most important to
Nixon - as to the Indians - was its religious significance. Indicating just how
powerful a national symbol the fight had become, the president reiterated his
hope that the return of Blue Lake marked the "start of a new road" in United
States-Indian relations, "one in which there will be more of an attitude of
cooperation rather than paternalism, one of self-determination rather than
termination, one of mutual respect."106
Epilogue

This study of the Taos recovery of Blue Lake raises a number of extremely
elusive questions, but several important conclusions can be drawn that suggest topics deserving further inquiry.107 First, the assurances of Stewart Udall
and William C. Schaab notwithstanding, the return of Blue Lake. to Taos
Pueblo did in fact set the legal staridard that so worried Clinton Anderson.
To be sure, even before the passage of H.R. 471, at least one other Indian
group had come forward with a land claim citing the so-called "Blue Lake
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precedent,"lIIK and as one historian notes, in the years following the Taos
Pueblo's victory, "millions of acres were returned to Indian tribes by judicial
or legislative action." These settlements were based at least in part on the
Taos decision. 109 Indeed, one of the most controversial claims currently sub
judice was almost certainly. inspired by the pueblo's struggle yo
Moreover, the return of Blue Lake also suggests an uncomfortable truth
about some of white America's perceptions of its reservation-bound neighbors: those Native Americans who most closely resemble the "ideal" indigenous type are easier for philanthropists, legislators, and even the general
public to support. Oliver La Farge captured this sentiment in a letter he wrote
shortly after attending a meeting of the Taos Pueblo Council in the 1950s,
explaining to his associates how this encounter had rejuvenated his enthusiasm for Indian advocacy: "I go through life telling myself that the fact that so
and so has a crew haircut, wears a necktie and business suit, does not mean
that he is any less an Indian. It is enormously relieving once again to sit with
Indians who completely look the part."11i
The Taos-clad in traditional garb and living in their traditional puebloqualified as perhaps the most "beautiful" of all North American Indian peoples, an attribute that clearly helped the Taos win assistance from individuals
and groups representing diverse political perspectives. It seems hardly accidental that the Taos would have been the one tribe that inspired John Collier's activist career, just as it is difficult to imagine Richard Nixon placing a
collection of similarly disenfranchised urban Indians at the center of his new
Native American policy. While the Taos case was indeed strong on its own
merits, there seems little doubt that more meaningful to the Pueblos' backers was the suit's powerful cultural symbolism: here were "real" Indians trying to maintain their noble ways in a changing and corrupt world.
Taos Pueblo's struggle to safeguard its traditions, however, has seen new
challenges arise in the years since the return of Blue Lake. Most significantly,
northern New Mexico has experienced dramatic population growth in the
last two decades to the point that in the early 1990S the Indians began to worry
once more about the erosion of their privacy. Instead of the old irritations,
such as trespassing by the occasional hunter or fisherman, the proliferation
of houses along the boundary set by Congress in 1970 posed a new threat.
Although Blue Lake itself was protected and the pueblo had recently won
back the so-called "Bottleneck" tract -a disputed 764-acre strip leading to the
watershed - the Taos became concerned about the rest of the area. III Would
its environmental integrity be compromised by the hordes of new residents
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in the region? Determined to preserve their people's solitude but lacking
legal claim to the land, the council elders opted for a different strategy. They
paid an estimated eleven million dollars in 1995 to buy up the remaining
property in the vicinity of Blue LakeY3
The pueblo chose an unexpected source to finance the purchase of this
territory, when one considers the Taos' cultural conservatism: they opened
a gambling casino in 1995, the profits from which they would use to make the
$864,000 annual payment on the land. While this decision perhaps underscored the tribe's commitment to protecting its religious shrines and practices
at all costs, building a casino also thrust the intensely private Taos into the
contentious debate in New Mexico (and the country at large) over gaming
on Indian reservations. Along with a number ofother Indian tribes in New
Mexico, the Taos endured numerous legal challenges from groups opposed
to gambling in the state, and the pueblo suffered constant anxiety that the
revocation of its casino permit would jeopardize the purchase of the Moreno
Ranch territory.1I4 Even when Indian gaming rights were finally affirmed in

1997 by an act of the New Mexico State Legislature, all tribes were forceel to
pay more than sixteen percent of their earnings to the state treasury, a sum'
that kept Taos Pueblo's bank account hovering near zero. 1I5 Although the
state legislature will soon consider a recent proposal that would reduce by
half the slot machine revenues required from each tribe with gaming operations,'--its passage is far from certain. 1I6
For the Taos, the outcome of this decision is only the most pressing concern regareling the tribe's ability to protect its sacred shrine and private religious rituals and beliefs. The pueblo's recently abandoned attempt to convert
a landmark hotel in Taos Village into the tribe's second gambling venue indicates that, even with the recovery of the Bottleneck and the purchase of the
Moreno Ranch land, the Pueblo perceives an on-going threat to Blue Lake,
one the Indians believe can only be forestalled through additional casino
revenues. 1I7 Meanwhile, the population' of northern New Mexico continues
to grow, and with it the demand for commercial and residential real estate,
suggesting perhaps that the battle for Blue Lake may not yet be over.
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109. Gordon-McCutchan, The Taos Indians,

219.

1l0. The Oneida Nation is seeking compensation from New York for more than 27°,000
acres taken illegally from the tribe after the signing of a 1790 treaty. Although I have
not been able to find any explicit reference to Blue Lake in articles concerning this
case, that the Oneida's first petition was filed in 197o-at the height of publicity on
the Taos matter-seems hardly coincidental. Likewise its initial request for land and
not money echoes the Taos strategy..
Ill.

Oliver La Farge, Report on Meeting with Taos Pueblo Council, 2 January 1956,
MIA Archives, box 268, folder 6.
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112. The "Taos Bottleneck" is so named because of its peculiar shape. Its return to Taos
Pueblo was effected by President Bill Clinton's 1996 signing of legislation introduced the year before by a New Mexico Congressional delegation that included
Representative Bill Richardson and Senators Pete Domenici and Jeff Bingaman.
"Bottleneck's Return Honored," Albuquerque Journal, 5 January 1997·
113. The pueblo acquired 16,000 acres of the 30,000-acre Moreno Ranch West from its
owner, Robert Butler, whose great-grandparents had purchased the property in 1943.
The Taos had long considered the area part of the pueblo's aboriginal lands seized
illegally by the federal government in 1906. See "Pueblo Working on a Ranch Deal,"
Albuquerque Journal, 21 January 1995·
114. For more on the casino issue in New Mexico, see "New Mexico's Big Gamble,"
Albuquerque Tribune, 28 June 1997·
115· "Taos Says It Can't Afford to Make Gambling Payment," Albuquerque Tribune, 31
January {998. Despite the regulatory fees, records reveal that the Taos still earned

net profits of$5.7 million in 1998, and $4.3 million in 1997· See "Tribal Casinos
Scoop Up Milhons, Documents Show," Albuquerque Tribune, 2 December 1999.
116. "Tribes' Slot Plan Endorsed," Albuquerque Journal; 28 March 2000 ..
117. "Taos Pueblo Drops Plan to Buy Kachina Lodge," Santa Fe New Mexican,
ruary 2000.
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Franciscans Eclipsed
CHURCH AND STATE IN SPANISH NEW MEXICO,

1750-1780

Jim Norris

T

he Franciscan mission system, in what the Spanish called the Kingdom

of New Mexico, challenged local civil government for power and influence from the time of the colony's permanent inception in 1598. At its zenith
in the seventeenth century, the Order of St. Francis maintained over forty
missions and as many as seventy friars labored in New Mexico. Their control
over the Puebloan peoples meant that the order held significant dominion
over the region's main economic asset: Indian labor. As the sole representatives of the Catholic Ch urch in New Mexico, the Franciscan friars controlled
spiritual affairs and shaped the moral behavior of all inhabitants. Using the
powers ofthe Inquisitioi-I, the friars protected their own status and attempted,
with some success, to expand their position at the expense of local government officials. The Franciscans' efforts did not go unchallenged, however,
and acrimonious struggles often characterized church and state relations.
Events associated with the Pueblo Revolt in 1680 and the subsequent Spanish reconquest in the 1690S altered the equation between the Franciscan friars
and civil authority. Civil and military affairs now began to dominate the

Jim Norris is an associate professor ofhistory at North Dakota State University. He received his
Ph.D. from Tulane University. Dr. Norris has published extensively on the Franciscan experience in colonial New Mexico. This article is adapted from his most recent book, After "The
Year Eighty": The Demise of Franciscan Power in Spanish New Mexico (University of New
Mexico Press,

2000).
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Spanish government's policy on the northern frontier of New Spain, and
during the next half century, Franciscans' status and authority in New Mexico diminished in relation to those of political and military officials. The friars
struggled to maintain their position and remained, at least, an influential
institution up to 1750. However, by 1780, the Franciscans had permanently
lost their authority and prestige in New Mexico.
In 1749 fray Andres Varo, cwdos (prelate) of the Franciscan priests in New
Mexico, finished an extensive informe (report) on the condition of the order's
mission efforts in the region. Varo's informe was the first such Franciscan selfexamination in over thirty years and had been specifically solicited by the
viceroy of New Spain in Mexico City. Propably no one was more qualified
to draft the report than fray Andresfor he had arrived in New Mexico in 1729
and had been custos at least three times since then,l
Varo's informe described a robust and vital mission operation in New
Mexico. The report listed three mission districts (Santa Fe, El Paso, and Junta
de los Rios), described their physical environments, and reported their livestock and agricultural capacities. Most missions produced surplus commodities for later distribution among the region's poor, who, the custos regretted,
were numerous. Every mission in the region had at least one friar assigned
to it except for Pecos and Galisteo, which together were served by a single
missionary. Eight friars labored among the Navajos. The two Navajo missions
established in the 1740S represented a significant triumph for the Franciscans
as the sites of their first new conversions in over a century. In addition, the
friars had stepped up their evangelical efforts among the Hopis and induced
over four hundred Tiwas, descendants of refugees from the 1690S reconquest
e~a, to leave the Hopis and congregate in anew mission at Sandia. The Crown
rewarded this surge in Franciscan evangelical activity with the restoration of
the order's jurisdiction over the Hopis, which had been given to the Jesuits
during the 1730S. Hence, at the end of the 1740s, the Franciscans had regained'some of their prestige and influence lost during their dark half-century after the Pueblo Revolt in 1680. 2
Such was clearly not the case a quarter century later when fray Francisco
Atanasio Dominguez wrote his comprehensive assessment of the New Mexico mission field in 1776. Dominguez arrived in New Mexico with orders to
inspect each mission and report on its condition. He was also to evaluate each
friar's evangelical performance, adherence to the rules of St. Francis, and
ability to speak Puebloan languages. He could transfer and discipline friars
as needed, although he "must not be too vociferous lest the defects of his
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brethren became known to the public." In short, the Franciscan leadership
desired that Dominguez improve the mission operation in New Mexico.'
Dominguez found the Franciscan missions in appalling condition. That
all the region's churches had earthen floors after so many years of use surprised him, and he was shocked that no church had been constructed yet at
Sandia; the Puebloans there made do in the ruins ofa pre-168o mission building. At Santa Clara, fray Francisco reported the church's adornments "so
soulless that I consider it unnecessary to describe anything so dead." He often
described vestments and other religious articles as "very worn" or "ugly." He
found the figure of Our Lady of the Rosary at San Juan decorated with "gewgaws," her dress and mantle "tattered," and a "moth-eaten wig" upon her
head. Over half the mission bells, one of the most enduring symbols of Spanish mission churches, did not function. They were broken, cracked, or miss~
ing their clappers. At Santa Ana, ironically, the neophytes were summoned
to mass with a "war drum."4
The Christian behavior of the Puebloans lagged far behind Dominguez's
expectations as well. Instruction in matters of the faith followed a sterile formula from mission to mission. Children simply recited the catechism at church
.each morning and evening, while adults did the same only on Saturdays and
feast days, when the Rosary was also said. Beyond mere memorization and
recitation, little else was done. Only two missions-Acoma and Jemez-employed more energetic and innovative teaching methods. The central problem, fray Francisco opined, was language. Few friars were fluent in the
language of their charges and Spanish fluency among the Puebloans was only
somewhat better. At only five missions had native people become fairly proficient in Spanish. Hence, confession was rare, except in cases of dire illnesses
or approaching death, perhaps because penitents feared what interpreters
would overhear. 5
His brother friars and their behaviors most disappointed Dominguez, although he circumscribed his comments in the official report. Significantly,
there were only about thirty friars in New Mexico, a decline of approximately
twenty-five percent since Yaro's report. The strongest official criticisms he
levied were that church registers were not up-to-date or that a friar's inventory of Franciscan property was inconsistent with his own findings. In private
letters written to Franciscan officials, however, Dominguez was more candid
and harsh in his evaluations. Many friars were too "old and ill" to be effective mission priests. One, fray Estanislai Mariano de Marulanda, had gone
blind. Dominguez judged at least nine Franciscans as physically incapable
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of managing their missions. Other friars were ineffective for more heinous reasons. Some were disobedient, others wanted only to obtain "temporal goods"
for themselves, and several were in debt to support their extravagances. One
friar had "borrowed" over seven hundred pesos fro~ the tithe. At least tWo
others were engaged in carnal relations with women employed in their conventos. Fray Patricio Cuellar was "a notorious drunkard," and still others were
"depraved, disobedient, bold characters and brothers who carry knive.s and
blunderbusses as ifthey were highwaymen." Including the infirm, Dominguez
concluded that over half of the Franciscans serving in the colony had no business doing so. Clearly, the Franciscans' position had undergone a dramatic
collapse since Varo's glowing assessment nearly three decades earlier. 6
In addition to questionable work ethics undermining their status, several
other problems contributed to the demise of the Franciscans' position in New
Mexico during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Friars posted to New
Mexico usually worked alone and continuously for an average of twenty
years, a condition of service that fostered the trend of old and sick mission
priests. Incessant attacks on the missions and settlements by Comanche,
Apache, and other native peoples sapped morale among all the region's inhabitants including the friars. A severe drought during the 1770S only made
the conditions of life more desperate. In addition, the royal treasury only sporadically paid the missionaries their stipends, forcing the friars into commercial activities to support themselves. Once that pattern was established, the
decision of some friars to gain personally involved only a short leap.
While these reasons contributed to the Franciscan breakdown, their impotence in dealing with government officials symbolized starkly their reduced
circumstances. During the seventeenth century the Franciscans in New Mexicowere equally powerful, if not more so, than local government officials. That
several governors were hauled to Mexico City in chains to face the Inquisition
attests to the clout the Franciscans held. However, the Pueblo Revolt of 1680
marked the beginning of a general decline in the friars' hegemony. After this
time, governors and other local officials steadily augmented power at the expense of the Franciscans. Alcaldes nwyores (district officers) became influential in Puebloan politics, governors exerted more control over the region's
economic policies, and even such matters as native witchcraft practices were
taken out of the friars' hands and turned over to New Mexico's civil authorities.
These developments complemented the Bourbon imperial goal of centralizing its authority over other privileged governmental bodies like the Catholic
Church. As a conseq)lence of this aim, the' Crown supported actions of civil

APRIL 2001

NORRIS -)-

165

authorities at the expense of the Franciscans in New Mexico by routinely ruling against the friars in disputes engendered by these changes. Still, not all
governors or alcaldes mayores exploited the new environment. Some were
incompetent, some solely interested in profit, and some in office too briefly.
The Franciscans were losing power; but only in fits and starts.
Beginning in 1750; however, local government officials gained irrevocable
power and position in New Mexico, and the friars found themselves, at last,
relegated permanently to second place. The Franciscans began 1750 on the
defensive and the year progressively worsened. The Franciscans learned that
the Jesuits had made two entradas into the Colorado-Gila region, raising
anew the friars' concerns about jurisdiction among the Hopis.i In addition,
the viceroy appointed don Tomas Velez Cachupfn as interim governor in

1750. Described by one historian as "young, full of ambition and not a little
impetuous," Velez Cachupfn had only recently been assigned to New Mexico to command the Santa Fe presidio's mounted troops prior to his appointment as governor. He would prove to be, however, a very capable governor. 8
Rather than using supplies and soldiers earmarked for the Navajo mission
~ield, the governor diverted these resources to combat Comanche raiders

instead. As a result of this deviation, the newly congregated Navajos bolted
from their missions. Although the rnain reason for their departure centered
on the fundamental differences between Navajos and Spaniards, the Franciscans blamed Velez Cachupfn. Consequently, the new governor found his
administration at odds with the Franciscans from the beginning.
Besides the Navajo incident, a conflict also arose between the Franciscans
and the governor over a report drafted by don Antonio de Ornedal y Maza.
Ornedal y Maza had come to New Mexico in 1749 for two official reasons:
to serve as juez de residencia (court judge) for the 'outgoing governor and to
inspect the presidios in New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya for the viceroy. Nowhere in his written duties was he asked to examine the Franciscan mission
.operation, but either on his own initiative or at the behest of Governor Velez
Cachupfn, Ornedal y Maza composed a critical report of the condition of the
New Mexico missions. 9 His report caused problems for the Franciscans w
The su bstance of most charges was not new, but the timing of the report was
unfortunate. It arrived in Mexico City about the same time, if not in the same
pouch, as Varo's informe. Ornedal y Maza's contradiction ofVaro's assessment outraged and embittered the FraI~ciscans, and their anger placed them
on a collision course with Governor Velez CachupfnY
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Initially, several friars authored lengthy rebuttals to Ornedal y Maza's report.
These categorically refuted all of his criticisms while offering counter allegations of abuse and misuse of power by the governor and alcaldes mayores. According to the Franciscans, Puebloans were forced to labor without pay; their
woven goods and agricultural commodities were taken without fair compensation; and presidial soldiers were ill-equipped and harshly treated by the governor and their officers. Franciscan officials in Mexico City deemed a written
rebuttal by fray Andres so incendiary that they suppressed it and gave only an
abridged version to another viceroy ten years later. Among other accusations,
Varo described Governor Velez Cachupfn as "childish ... without maturity,
knowledge, or experience." The provincial of Santo Evangelio, who oversaw the
New Mexico missions, also wrote a long protest to Ornedal y Maza's report. 12
That Franciscans disputed the report came as no surprise, but to add weight
to their refutations, they collected affidavits from the region's citizens attesting
to the missionaries' exemplary behavior and devout attention to their duties.
Thirteen Spaniards of prominence, including former alcaldes mayores, current presidial officers, and the assistant governor-captain general of Nueva Vizcaya, made testimonialsY Support for the friars from such individuals was
potentially the most effective weapon the friars could marshal against Ornedal
y Maza's report.
At this point Governor Velez Cachupfn did the unexpected and unprecedented: he derailed the entire controversy. First, he moved to unify local
government, forbidding any current alcalde mayor, presidial soldier, or other
government official in New MexIco from testifying either for or against
Ornedal y Maza's report. Second, none of these officials could certify any
Franciscan report. By default, only Velez Cachupfn's signature could legitimize Franciscan documents leaving New Mexico. Any violation of these orders wOllld result in a two hundred peso fine and/orloss of position to the
offender. And finally, to prevent even noncertified information by his Franciscan detractors from reaching Mexico City, the governor directed that no
Franciscan mail, except for correspondence pertaining to the Inquisition,
could leave New Mexico without his approval. In this manner, Velez Cachupfn silenced the friars-something no other governor had been able to
do-without challenging the Inquisition. Even more astonishing was that his
executive intervention worked and Franciscan correspondence from New
Mexico soon slowed to a trickle. 14
The motivations behind the governor's actions remain unclear. Unlike
ITlany of his predecessors, Vdez Cachupfn left no written statements of a
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clearly antireligious or anti-Franciscan nature. He seems to have been less generous to the Franciscans than were many eighteenth-century governors, al- .
though he did purchase new vestments, linens, and an altar screen for the
mission at San Juan. Certainly, New Mexico was under dire military threat by
Comanche raiders in 1750, and the governor likely viewed the Ornedal y Maza
matter as a distraction, with the potential to factionalize his administration. I;
In addition to external political difficulties, conditions soon worsened for the
Franciscans when an internal struggle erupted. Realizing that Governor Velez
Cachupfn exempted Inquisition reports from civil interference, custos Varo
requested that fray Pedro Montano, local commissary of the Holy Office, initiate an Inquisition investigation against the governor. The immediate consequence of such an inquiry would have been testimonials, interrogations, and
related documents leaving New Mexico unimpeded. Furthermore, Inquisition involvement might have intimidated Velez Cachupfn, put him on the
defensive, or even lead to his removal from office. That strategy had often
worked in the seventeenth century. Montano, though, refused to open the
investigation, and the ensuing conflict between him and Varo plunged the
Franciscans into turmoil for two years. At a time when they most needed to
present a united front, they instead turned against each other, further weakening Franciscan power and prestige. 16
The diminution of Franciscan power resulting from the Ornedal y Maza
affair could be clearly seen by 1753 in Governor Velez Cachupfn's comprehensive report to the viceroy on the state of the colony. The document was
highly critical of the mission operations run by the Franciscans, noting that
they were little concerned about their neophytes and calling into question
their "dedication and diligence." In the past such a condemnation by a civil
officer would have quickly drawn a vociferous response from the friars, but
none was forthcoming. Velez Cachupfn had effectively muted the Franciscans and secured clear hegemony over the friars in New MexicoY
The appointment of a new governor in 1754, dpn Francisco Marfn del
Valle, led to no improvement in the friars' position, for he kept in place the
virtual gag order against the Franciscans. Only Inquisitional documents
could freely leave the region, and government officials refused to certify most
other Franciscan documents. For example, when the custos, fray Jacobo
Castro, inspected all the missions in 1755, alcaldes mayores from the respective districts observed him throughout; however, they refused to certify any
part of the inspection and in the end Santiago Roybal, the Diocese of Durango's vicar and ecclesiastical judge, endorsed Castro's report-a hum ilia-
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tion in itself for the Franciscans. These civil obstructions effectively reduced
the volume of Franciscan documents in the 1750S to a fraction of what it had
been in earlier periods. If the friars could neither present their views nor defend themselves in the higher councils of Spanish government, they were
virtually impotent·to influence affairs in the colony. By the conclusion of
Marfn del Valle's administration in 1759, the Franciscans had been relegated
to virtual nonentities in New Mexico, except in spiritual matters. IS
The rapid erosion of the Franciscan position with local officials during the
1750S was further evidenced by their reaction to the bishop of Durango's visita
(inspection) in 1760. The matter of episcopal jurisdiction had been a lengthy,
acrimonious affair in New Mexico's history. In fact, the Franciscans contested
the authority of the Diocese of Durango since that episcopate was created by
royal order in 1621. As long as the Franciscans were free of a bishop's control,
they were the religious masters of the colony. In a series of confrontations between 1715 and 1737, the Diocese of Durango had gained control ofNew Mexico. During this time, the Franciscans still resisted diocesan authority and had
made two previous episcopal visitas difficult forthe bishops. However by 1760,
Bishop don Pedro Tamaron y Romeral encountered no Franciscan snubs; the
friars bent over backwards to accommodate him. The bishop wrote that they
responded to him "as if they were secular priests." Primarily, the Franciscans
viewed Bishop Tameron y Romeral as a potential ally against civil authorities
and made him aware of the abuses they had suffered at the hands of recent
governors. The friars continued to tolerate diocesan interactions even after
the visita. When Tamaron y Romeral asked for periodic reports, the Franciscans dutifully supplied them, and they protested no other instructions from
Durango. Clearly, they no longer viewed the diocese as their ma;n foe. 19
A brief period ofgubernatorial instability may have given the Franciscans
hope of regaining some lost influence, but whatever opening they saw soon
closed when Velez Cachupfn returned to Santa Fe in 1762 to begin a second
term as governor. At the time Spain was faring poorly in the Seven Years' War,
and once again Puebloans and Spaniards in New Mexico suffered from
destructive Comanche, Apache, and Ute raids. The Crown ordered Velez
Cachupfn to stabilize and defend Spain's northern colony, and he succeeded. Bp767 the native people along New Mexico's frontiers had been
reasonably pacified. 20
Velez Cachupfn renewed his executive pressure on the friars as well. He
. reported to the viceroy that the Franciscans collected funds for far too many
missionaries. No friars had filled the two empty positions at Zuni during the
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past year, and two of the missions in the Junta de los Rios district were without friars. In addition, six other friars, because "of their advanced age. and
habitual indisposition," were unfit to serve as Christian evangelicals. The
governor wanted these Franciscan deficiencies corrected or government stipends permanently revoked for ten posts. Incredibly, the Franciscans in New
Mexico made no response to these charges but left their defense to the provincial of Santo Evangelio. The government, however, maintained the number of Franciscan posts in New Mexico at this time. Significantly, in 1763, the
Spanish Crown allocated to New Mexico only 11,450 pesos for the mission
program in contrast to approximately 32,000 pesos that went to the presidial
garrison in Santa Fe. From an accounting perspective alone, the importance
of the evangelical work had been eclipsed by political and military agendas. 21
Indeed, His Majesty's government remained concerned about defending
New Spain's northern frontier and, in 1766, the Marques de Rubi visited New
Mexico to assess its defenses as part ofan inspection ofthe military security and
presidial system across the northern frontier. In previous in~pections, the mission operations had always factored into considerations of frontier policy, but
the marques's report, failing to mention the friars at all, reflected their decreased importance. In fact, the marques's inspection gave rise to the Regla-

mento de 1772 (Regulation of 1772), which, among other policies, further
increased presidial salaries. In the new pay scale, a priest serving as presidial ..
chaplain received 480 pesos per year while a Franciscan missionary's alms
remained fixed at 330 pesos. The difference further attested to the reduced
status of evangelicals. 22 Governor Velez Cachupin's second administration
. ended in 1767. He had dispatched other reports critical of the Franciscan mission program to Mexico City, but the friars mustered no defense against his
neg~tive assessments. Perhaps his restoration ofsome peace and security to the
region had engendered gratitude among some friars. Still, the Franciscans'
position had further eroded.
The installation of a new governor, don Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta,
offered little hope for the Franciscans. Appointed in 1767, he was an experienced military man with an administrative background. Two ominous events
for the New Mexico friars transpired early in Fermin de Mendinueta's tenure. First, Charles III ordered the expulsion of the Jesuits from the New
World. For New Mexico's friars, the expulsion ofthe Society ofJesus removed
a long-time Franciscan rival from the mission field. No longer would the
Franciscans have to worry about or contest their jurisdictional bo{mdary with
Jesuits to the west. However, the Crown's aggressive act must have also re-
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minded some friars that Bourbon policy continued to weaken Catholic authority and subordinate the church to the Spanish secular government. If the
monarchy could arbitrarily expel the Jesuits, the king could deal the same
treatment to the Order ofSt. Francis. As the Society ofJesus vacated the frontier, the Franciscans took over its missions in northern New Spain, stretching Francisc~n resour'ces even thinner.
The second grave development involved a viceregal plan to secularize
Spanish villas - specifically El Paso, Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Santa Cruz
de la Canada-in New Mexico. In 1765 Bishop Tamaron y Romeral offered
three reasons why these sites should be taken from the Franciscans. First, he
noted the Franciscans' historical reluctance to cooperate with diocesan officials; second, he described the friars' many failures with the Puebloan people
and the ordds inability to improve its evangelical performance; and third,
the region's inhabitants continued to practice witchcraft and other idolatries.
Tamaron y Romeral submitted this petition during the second administration
of Velez Cachupfn, and the friars in New Mexico did not defend themselves,
leaving Santo Evangelio officials to argue against the bishop's proposalY
The viceregal ruling on Tamar6n y Romeral's petition did not come until
near the end ofFermfn de Mendinueta's first year as governor. Based on the
advice of his fiscal (royal attorney), the viceroy (the marques de Croix) rejected Tamaron y Romeral's request. The fiscal noted that the bishop ofDurango had not fulfilled all proper legal requirements. His Majesty's law
expected him to offer the viceroy at least two secular priests as candidates for
each parish position. Tamar6n y Romeral had recommended only one priest
in all, for the post in El Paso. Furthermore, the fiscal noted, the bishop of
Durango's main reason to secularize these villas originated in his displeasure
with the friars' work among the Puebloan people, not the Spanish parishioners in the villas. 24 Despite the victory, the Franciscans still had little reason
to celebrate the viceroy's ruling. The fiscal's opinion did not rule out secularizing these communities, but declared only that Tamaron y Romeral had
not followed proper procedures. The bishop died before he could respond to
this rejection. Although his successor did not pursue the matter, the threat
continued to hang over the Franciscans. Indeed, secularization of these villas would take place near the end of the century.
Throughout most of Fermfn de Mendinueta's administration, lasting until

1778, the governor avoided major clashes with the Franciscans. These were
some of the most difficult years for the inhabitants of New Mexico. The peace
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hammered out with the Comanche people by Governor Velez CachupIn
broke down in 1768, and Comanche raiders, soon joined by other nomadic
tribes, made life miserable for Spaniards and Puebloans alike. Between 1768
and 1778 virtually every Spanish villa (including Santa Fe) and Franciscan
mission experienced the terror of an attack: This situation was made more
pernicious by a severe drought that began in the early 1770S and lasted about
ten years. Crops failed and livestock died en masse. Comanche assaults made
unsafe laboring in the fields. As food production declined, the threat of famine stalked New Mexico. Indian thefts oflivestock became so enormous that
the Spanish government sent 1,5°0 horses to New Mexico in 1775. Spaniards
crowded into larger communities for safety, while others joined the exodus
to El Paso. 25
Amid such unrelenting crises, FermIn de Mendinueta devoted his attention primarily to the defense of New Mexico, and the friars just tried to stay
alive, performing little evangelical work in the process. Several times, the
governor complained to Mexico City that the friars failed to provide regular
religious services, that many friars were incompetent, and that some missions
remained without staff. The Franciscans' response to FermIn de Mendinueta's negative reports was silence, although the Franciscan hierarchy acted
by sending DomInguez to New Mexico in 1776.26
DomInguez, too, failed to right the Franciscan cart. In response to his
report, some friars were replaced and fresh missionaries, posted to New Mexico. However, any positive developments soon vanished in the great smallpox
epidemic of 1780-1781. Approximately one-quarter of New Mexico's population succumbed, a decline sufficient enough for the new governor, don Juan
Bautista de Anza, to.request successfully the number of Franciscan billets be
lowered from thirty-four to twenty. This loss represented the first official reduction in the number of Franciscan personnel in New Mexico. From this
time forward, the Franciscans' presence further dwindled and the position of
the friars, once the rival of local officers, had been eclipsed. 27
Numerous historical forces contributed to the collapse of Franciscan
power in New Mexico during the eighteenth century. Due to the legacy of
el ana achenta - "the year eighty," as Franciscan documents sometimes referred to the Pueblo Revolt-and the turbulent reconquest period, friars
sought a more accommodating relationship with the Puebloans than they
had observed in the seventeenth century. Although this new posture created
a more pacific mission climate throughout New Mexico, it opened the friars
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to civil charges of evangelical incompetence. In addition, the Franciscan
hierarchy in Mexico City maintained an inflexible mission program that hurt
the friars. Priests were sent to New Mexico ill prepared to serve among the
Natives, especially in regard to language, and then left in the mission field far
too long. Their position eroded further when the Bishopric of Durango established jurisdiction over New Mexico during the 1730S. No longer did friars hold absolute sway over matters of faith. And finally, the growing strength
oflocal government during the 170os, culminating in the critical 1750-1780
period, played a crucial part in the Franciscan demise. Bolstering the power
oflocal civil officials atthe expense of the church hallmarked Bourbon policy
during this period. The Crown sought to centralize power and make the em-.
pire efficierit, profitable, and secure. The king broke the back of any institutions opposed, to these goals. Franciscan missions in New Mexico fell into
that category, and consequently the hegemony of the state over the Catholic
Church became one of the primary causes in the breakdown of Franciscan
power in New Mexico.
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Park View
A CHICAGO AGRICULTURAL COLONY IN
NORTHERN NEW MEXICO

Robert J. T6rrez

O

n Tuesday, 25 July 1972, the northern New Mexico village of Park View
bustled with activity as the San Jose Parish prepared to celebrate its
annual fiesta de Santiago; or feast of St. James. The scheduled events included the usual vespers, morning mass, and procession through the village's
main (and only) street. However, there seemed to be an unusual level of anticipation in the air as the gathering crowd discussed a unique item in that year's
schedule of events. According to the poster issued to publicize the fiesta, the
mass that morning would include a public declaration, the "Proclamaci6n de
Los Ojos" during which the name of the village, Park View, would be officially
returned to its original name, Los Ojos. The proclamation read that day culminated a year-long struggle by the residents of Los Ojos to regain the name
chosen by their ancestors who had settled the Tierra Amarilla land grant more
than a century earlier. Los Ojos was one of the original settlements established
within the grant between 1860 and 1863, but for some unknown reason, most
maps and descriptions of the region soon after designated the village as Park
View. No one seemed to recall how this name change had come about. Certainly, nobody in the village imagined that the Park View name originated in
Chicago, Illinois, in the mind of a land speculator who envisioned the Tierra
Amarilla grant as an agricultural colony for European immigrants. 1
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The decades following the Mexican-American War were a period of
change for the territories obtained from Mexico by the United States through
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Within a generation, the states and
territories of California, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona
were carved from the Mexican Cession. This extraordinary expansion of the
country's boundaries provided many opportunities for entrepreneurs to develop myriad projects ranging from the legitimate to the unscrupulous and
designed to attract settlers to every imaginable corner of this sparsely populated region. Developers and investors, often under the auspices of colonization societies, began the process by purchasing large tracts of land in the
West. They then developed elaborate promotional materials for distribution
in cities of the eastern and midwestern United States as well as Europe hoping to attract immigrants to their property. Many ofthese advertisements consisted of what one government report of the time kindly described as
"information of an enticing character."2
These development companies attracted prospective pioneers with vivid,
albeit exaggerated, claims of the services they could provide to new arrivals.
One 1874 booklet that promoted an agricultural colony in the vicinity of
Colorado Springs, Colorado, summarized how colonization companies
could ease a settler's concerns about the hardships inherent to starting a new
life in the western wilderness:"even the first disadvantage ... of being obliged
to prepare the land for irrigation, may often be counteracted by ... development companies, which will have capital enough to construcUhe irrigation
ditches, layout the farms and town, build the dwellings [and] sell the tracts
to the colonists at small annual payments. , .."3William Blackmore, a British entrepreneur who prorrwted colonies in New Mexico an'd Colorado, was
even more emphatic about colonization, "Now we can go west," boasted one
of his brochures, "and find civilization ready-made to order waiting to receive
US."4 Sales pitches such as these succeeded in attracting thousands of settlers
to the West.
In this expansionist spirit, speculators attempted to establish several agricultural colonies in New Mexico during the last decades of the nineteenth
century. One of the earliest of these was Park View, which a Chicago-based
corporation established within the Tierra Amarilla land grant in northern
New Mexico in 1876. The land grant had been given to Manuel Martinez
and several other individuals by the Mexican government in 1832. (Confirmed to Francisco Martinez, Manuel's son, by the United States Congress
in 1860, the grant has become one of New Mexico's most controversial cases
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ofland grant adj udication.) Located along the New Mexico-Colorado border,
the Tierra Amarilla grant straddled the RIo Chama, one of the RIo Grande's
major tributaries, and consisted of more than a half-million acres of the finest
agricultural, grazing, and timber tracts in New Mexico Territory. This magnificent property sat squarely within the part of northemNew Mexico that one of
William Blackmore's promotional brochures described as having extraordinary
.potential for supporting large populations "in health, food, and wealth.'"
Beginning in the mid-1860s, the economic potential ofthe Tierra Amarilla
grant attracted a number of entrepreneurs and speculators who purchased substantial interests in the grant from Manuel Martinez's heirs. Enrique Mercure,
Elias Brevoort, and Thomas D. Bums were a few ofthe individuals who played
an important role in these ~arly transactions,.but the principal figure among
those who charted the course of the Tierra Amarilla grant was Thomas B.
Catron. Catron came to New Mexico in 1866 and quickly obtained the first of
several important public offices he held during his long and controversial
career. By 1870, he and various partners began to purchase interests in Spanish and Mexican land grants throughout New Mexico. Catron's holdings became so extensive that, by the eve of the twentieth century, he was considered
the largest private landownerin the United States. He organized or authorized
colonization projects on several of the grants he owned or controlled, but apparently none succeeded. Violle Clark Hefferan, one of Catron's biographers,
attributes this dismal record largely to the men Catron hired to manage and
promote his properties. According to Hefferan, these men tended "to detract
rather than add" to the success of Catron's colonization enterprises. 6 Park View
was apparently no exception.
Catron undoubtedly had a significant impact on the history of New Mexico, but his most enduring legacy is the one that lingers in the Tierra Amarilla
grant, which was patented to him in 1880. In the mid-1870s Catron was busy
maneuvering to acquire every interest in the Tierra Amarilla grant from Manuel MartInez's heirs. In early 1876, he hired Wilmot E. Broad to serve as his
agent in Tierra Amarilla for that purpose. 7 It is not certain how Catron and
Broad came to know each other, but Broad was apparently on the lookout for
the opportunity that presented itself when Catron hired him.
Four years earlier Broad, John S. Corthell, and William G. Thompson
had incorporated The New Mexico Stock and Agricultural Association in
Illinois for the purpose of "colonizing and bringing into use tracts oflands in
the territories of New Mexico and Colorado, and improving lands in said
territories," and "raising, buying and selling, and dealing in live stock, open-
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ing and working mines and dealing in mining materials." Headquartered in
Chicago, the Association issued one hundred thousand dollars of capital
stock in February ~876.8 At about the same time Catron l1ired Broad to represent his interests in Tierra Amarilla. Within a month, the 14 March 1876
issue of Santa Fe's Weekly New Mexican reported rumors that "responsible
Chicago parties" were interested in establishing a colony in the San Juan
River area of northwestern New Mexico. In 1876, the corporation also published and distributed a beautiful map of New Mexico, which they touted as
"more perfect than any heretofore published." Advertisements lined the borders of this splendid map. In one ad, the Association pledged itself to being
"at all times prepared to sell lands in the Territory of New Mexico ... for
Mining Purposes, Stock-raising and Agricultural pursuits." The ad also
offered to provide prospective colonists transportation "from Eastern Cities
to ... All Parts of Southern Colorado and New Mexico."9
Broad and his partners spent the summer of1876 searching for a colony site,
even extending their efforts into the still sparsely settled "Navajo Country" of
northwestern New Mexico. William F. M. Arny, one of the most ardent promotors of New Mexico, served as their guide. lO Arny held several positions in
New Mexico's territorial government, including territorial secretary and acting
governor in the mid-186os. He also spent several terms as federal agent for the
Utes and Jicarilla Apaches, positions that enabled him to become intimately
familiar with much of northern New Mexico and southwestern Colorado.
Arny's knowledge of New Mexico and its resources proved invaluable to the
Chicago corporation, although his biographer insists he became involved in
colonization schemes only when financial circumstances reduced him to
guiding tours of "Indian country" for a "small fee."11
How Broad and his partners chose the site on which to establish their colony
is unknown to historians. Whatever plans they had for northwestern New
Mexico never materialized, and by late summer 1876, they decided to locate
their settlement squarely within· the Tierra Amarilla grant. They staked out
town lots and a site for a city hall on a low plateau that overlooks the Rio Chama
approximately one mile north of present-day Los Brazos.12 The new town was
christened Park View. According to local tradition, the name was chosen because of the colony's picturesque location,1J an image evident in a letter C. S.
Olmsted published in the December 1876 issue ofthe Chicago Prairie Farmer:
Perhaps a letter froni this part of our Union ... would be interesting to
... those who contemplate coming here to make this country their
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home.... [T]he new town of Park View has just been laid out. ... It
is, indeed, a beautiful spot for a town
nestling in a beautiful valley
tops are covered with
near the base of the mountains, whose
glistening snow from October to June and July, while the sides of the
. same ... and the ravines and valleys below, are covered with a mantle
of green and luxuriant vegetation amid which are found numberless
varieties of flowers .... The scenery here is grand and beautiful and
worthy [on the pen and brush of poet and painter.
Olmsted's letter described the region's abundant water and timber resources,
but he was especially impressed by the economic potential of the wool market. "The chances for profitable investment of even small amounts of capital ... is good," he wrote, and predicted a prosperous future for the
"intelligent and enterprising people" who were emigrating to the colony.'4 .
The earliest colonists reached Park View in September 1876. That month,
the Colorado Daily Chieftain of Pueblo reported that a Chicago-based colonization company had settled "about thirty persons" on the Tierra Amarilla
grant and that more colonists were expected to arrive shortly.15 The following
month, William G. Thompson and John L. Corthell, two of Broad's partners,
were reported to be at Pueblo, escorting twenty additional colonists to Tierra
Amarilla. '6 In February 1877, Thompson was appointed postmaster for the
new townY Despite all the activity, no one registered property transactions
associated with the colony until February 1877. That month, Broad and his
partners recorded their purchase of a one-eighteenth interest in the Tierra
Amarilla grant from Elias Brevoort. '8 Several weeks later, the Santa Fe Daily

New Mexican, the region's principal newspaper, reported that Broad had
purchased a large tract of land for a c~lony in Rio Arriba. The paper noted
several "free American citizens" were already on the property, and additional
settlers were anticipated before the end of the year. 19 Later, in spring 1877, the
same newspaper reported that Broad had been in Santa Fe and was on his
way to Chicago on busi ness related to "the interests of the colonization society" of that city.zO Other regional newspapers also reported a slow but steady
flow of emigrants making their way to Park View throughout the summer of

1877. The Colorado Daily Chieftain likewise described wagons loaded with
baggage and several families from Chicago rolling toward Park View. A "fine
portable saw mill, shingle mill and other machinery" were also en route. 21
By all accounts, the budding colony seemed to have a bright future. The

Daily New Mexican not only enthusiastically reported regular arrivals of
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"farmers and stock growers" at the Association's property but proclaimed Park
View the "chief settlement" of the region. Newspaper writers'even anticipated that the colony was on the verge of becoming the "county seat," although they did not specify of which county.22If they meant Rfo Arriba
County, Park View could have become the county seat only if the territorial
legislature authorized its relocation from Alcalde and realigned the county
boundaries, for Park View was located in Taos County.
Although this newspaper report seems to be a simple, overly enthusiastic
promotion of the colony, the "county seat" comment may have had some
merit. The highly touted A. Z. Huggins map, alluded to above, added to the
northern boundary ofRfo Arriba County most of the Tierra Amarilla region.
Indeed, a major realignment of the Rfo Arriba and Taos county boundaries
and relocation of the Rfo Arriba County seat from Alcalde to Las Nutritas
(present-day Tierra Amarilla) was a~tually accomplished in 1880. 23 The realignment possibly had its genesis in Broad's grandiose scheme for the Park
View colony.
Despite these optimistic reports and expectations, the colony quickly floundered. In late summer of 1877, a military survey team, commanded by Lieutenant C. A. H. M'Cauley of the United States Army Corps of Topographical
Engineers, passed through Tierra Amarilla. According to M'Cauley's report,
Park View consisted of eight cabins and twenty to thirty persons, with less than
ten acres under cultivation. 24 He wrote, 'This was a Chicago colony, with aspects much beclouded," and noted that most of the colonists had abandoned
the settlement and gone to the "Animas region" of southwestern Colorado. 25
Reverend Sheldon Jackson, publisher of the Rocky Mountain Presbyterian in
Denver, Colorado, echoed M'Cauley's observations when he passed through
Tierra Amarilla in fall 1877. Jackson reported eight families living at the "Chicago colony" and community leaders still speaking "hopefully ofits prospects."
However, he added, "[T]o a stranger, it does not give promise ofrapid growth."26
No extant documentation fully explains why the colony failed. Unless
Broad and his partners perpetrated outright fraud, they probably failed to recruitenough colonists to lend stability and strength to the venture. Perhaps the
one hundred thousand dollars of capital stock they attributed to the corporation in 1876, if it ever really existed, proved inadequate to promote and bring
to fruition the plans and promises made for the colony. Most likely, however,
Broad and his partners were unable to overcome the challeflges of land titles,
divided interests, and rampant speculation that characterized the adjudication
of New Mexico's land grants during this period. The one-eighteenth interest
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in the Tierra Amarilla grant they purchased from Elias Brevoort in February
1877 probably lacked documentation sufficient enough to provide the Park
View colonists with reliable title to the land. Another possibility is that Broad
and his partners incurred Catron's wrath because they were developing property within the grant without his knowledge or approval. By itself, anyone of
these problems would have guaranteed the failure of the project; together,
they doomed the col~ny before it had an opportunity to take root.
Three personal accounts from Park View settlers provide some details
about the failure ofthe colony, but even these stories leave many unanswered
questions. One is from Augusta C. Skogg, daughter of Swedish immigrants
and wife ofJohnSkogg, a farmer from Minnesota. In the fall of 1876, while
scouting for a sawmill site near La Veta, Colorado, John Skogg, his brother,
and several companions heard about the Park View cblony. They went to
Tierra Amarilla and apparently liked what they saw; After purchasing some
lots, they returned to Minnesota to bring their families to New Mexico. In
April 1877, Skogg and his family returned to La Veta, where they joined Broad
and several other Park View colonists. Together, they traveled on horseback
as far as Conejos, a settlement located just north of the New Mexico border
along the principal road between southern Colorado and northern New
Mexico. When they arrived at Conejos, someone advised them that the lots
they had purchased earlier were on "the old Catron Spanish land grant and
could not legally be sold." Augusta Skogg elaborated neither on who broke
this news to them nor on how Broad explained this regrettable turn of events.
She seems to have seen Broad as a victim of circumstances over which he had
no control and simply described their unfortunate situation as "a financial.
loss [which] necessitated a change of plans."Z? Her account and the newspaper reports of earlier colonists on their way'to Park View clearly demonstrate
that Broad and his partners were vigorously, if not desperately, promoting the
colony and selling lots several months before they actually purchased their
interest in the grant frorD Elias Brevoort in February 1877"
No documentation, legal or personal, implicates the promoters of the
colony in any fraudulent intent, but the impression of fraud is strongly suggested by Edward Thomas, another Park View colonist. Thomas was a Welsh
immigrant who came.to New Mexico following a chance meeting with Broad
in Chicago, possibly during the latter's reported trip to the East in April ,1877'
Broad convinced Thomas to invest his two-tho~lsand-dollar savings and emigrate to the "Boston Colony" he was organizing in New Mexico, but Thomas
and his family did not find a permanent home at Park View. "Colonel Broad
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was a swindler," Thomas's biographer noted, "a shrewd agent," who "easily won
the confidence of the inexperienced colonists, and ... soon secured all the
money and property they possessed,,!eaving them in a destitute condition.
[Thomas] left the little colony with ... a burro and a coffee mill, which thanks
to Colonel Broad's ingenuity, had cost this colonist the sum of $2,000."28
Although they abandoned the Park View colony, Skoggs and Thomas did
not move far. Thomas loaded his coffee mill and few remaining possessions
on his burro, made his way to northwestern New Mexico, and settled his
family near present-day Farmington. John Skogg and his family moved to
Conejos, Colorado, but maintained close ties to northern New Mexico.
Skogg returned to the Park View site in 1884 and operated a flour mill there
for several years. Further research may uncover descendants of Park View
colonists who still live in New Mexico or Colorado.
The 1880 census shows that, three years after its inception, Park View consisted of eleven families living in ten dwellings. Four of these households had
Spanish surnames and may have been local families who moved into cabins
abandoned by departing colonists. The census listed neither Olmsted, the
enthusiastic letter writer who had foreseen such a bright future for the
colony, nor Thompson, the Park View postmaster, among those remaining
settlers. 29 The 1880 census also points out what may have been an important
connection between the Scandinavian immigrant population of the Chicago
region and emigration to Park View. Of the fourteen non-Spanish-:surnamed
adult males still residing at Park View, three- Theodore Seth, Paul Westerly,
and John Peterson-listed their country of origin as Sweden. During late
1876 and early 1877, the' Sycamore True Republican, an Illinois newspaper,
reported that Westerly, Peterson, Gustav MaIm, Soney Lu'ndgren, and several other individuals from DeKalb County, Illinois, were on their way to the
New Mexico colony.30
As they traveled to Park View, Gustav MaIm described the trials,of these
emigrants. On 14 February 1877 MaIm wrote aletter from Pueblo, Colorado,
to his nephew, Samuelson, on stationary with the letterhead of Pueblo merchant R. Sherman:
I will write a few lines and tell you about our travels hither, it all went
safely and well, but you can never imagine how large tracts of
ungrazed land [are that] we have passed through .... [Pueblo] is not
much to the world, it is a little too far from the mines; they charge 10
cents a mile to go on the railroad to a town called La Veta, it is 70
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miles from here, [and] we have decided to go over land by mule team;
we have 250 miles to travel until we get to our destination, a town
called Park view [sic].
MaIm explained that, after making these arrangements, the man they
hired to provide transportation backed out. MaIm and an unnamed Norwegian traveling companion then decided to. take the train to La Veta, where
they hoped to hire a mule team to complete their journey to New Mexico.
It is unknown if MaIm ever reached the colony, but a descendant speculates
that MaIm was going to Park View because he had relatives or acquaintances there and planned to use the settlement as a "jumping off place" to the
gold fields of southwestern Colorado. 3] If MaIm reached Park View, he did
not stay long. Nearly two years later, a Lawrence, Kansas, newspaper reported
his death on 5 February 1879. The story indicated he died from complications
of "scrofula," an illness he contracted while in New Mexico. The article explained MaIm had emigrated from Wexico, Sweden, in 1864, and enlisted in
the Union Army at Sycamore, Illinois, that same year. Honorably discharged
at war's end, he returned to Sycamore before moving west to seek his fortune.
He was apparently trying to make his way back to Sycamore when he died in
Lawrence. 32
MaIm's story, together with the presence of John Skogg and the other
Swe.des, suggests The New Mexico Stock and Agricultural Association recruited heavily among the Scandinavian and other immigrant populations in
the Midwest. Broad's earlier experience with the Evans, Colorado, colony,
organized in Illinois in 1871,33 provided him and his partners the necessary
contacts to tap this pool of immigrants when they incorporated The New
Mexico Stock and Agricultural Association in Chicago in 1872. Certainly,
Park View was not the only colony that lured Scandinavians to New Mexico
from the Chicago area. In 1881.; nearly fifty Norwegians emigrated from
Chicago to San Pedro, a tiny community located along the Rio Grande approximately eighty miles south ofAlbuquerque. This colony was also a shortlived enterprise. 34
Wilmot E. Broad and Theodore Seth were the only non-Spanish-surnamed persons living at Park View in 1880 to become permanent residents
of the Tierra Amarilla area. Theodore Seth established a flour mill and a
small saw mill near the colony site and operated these enterprises for many
years. John Skogg managed Seth's flour mill when he returned to the area in

188+ Wilmot E. Broad continued working for Thomas B. Catron as full time
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manager of the Tierra Amarilla grant. A determined entrepreneur, Broad
attempted several other businesses ventures, most of which failed. One of
these undertakings, the Monera Coal and Coke Company, was financed by
a note cosigned by Catron. When the company failed, Broad's position as
manager of the grant became what one of Catron's biographers described as
"debt servitude:" When Broad died in 1907, he was still working for Catron
and had not yet paid off the debt to his employer. 35 The New Mexico Pioneers, a historical association of which Broad was a charter member, eulogized him in a manner he probably would have appreciated. The eulogy
credited northern New Mexico's prosperity to Broad's many "well directed
efforts" and noted he was one of the first to draw public attention to the "beautiful valleys in the vicinity of Tierra Amarilla and Park View and attract immigration for theirdevelopment."36
Despite the failure of Broad's Park View colony, its name survived. By 1879,
the post office at Park View had been closed, possibly because the dwindling
population no longer warranted its own post office. When a new one was reopened in 1880, it was relocated to the village of Los Ojos two miles south of
the nearly abandoned colony site. Despite being moved to one of the original
well-established Hispano settlements of the Tierra Amarilla grant, the post office retained its designation as the "Park View Post Office."37 During subsequent generations, the village ofLos Ojos itself became known as Park View.
Although the name change took hold on maps, memory of Park View's
original name apparently remained in the hearts and minds of Los Ojos
residents. In the wake of the activism that swept through the Tierra Amarilla
grant in the 196~s, area residents became increasingly curious about their
local history. By 197o,some in the community had raised questions about
how the namePark View came to be applied to one of the land grant's oldest
extant settlements. The region's younger citizens learned that older residents
recalled the not-sa-distant past when Park View was known by its original
name of Los Ojos. Others, not aware of the name change, wondered how
Park View had been given a name so inconsistent with those of its sister villages of Los Brazos, La Puente, Tierra Amarilla, Plaza Blanca, and Ensenada.
Subsequent research found no evidence that the village had ever been officially designated as Park View. 38
In 1971, Park View's residents launched a controversial campaign to regain
its original name. A petition circulated in the community to gauge support
for the name change was followed bymore than a year of debate among local
residents and negotiations with federal and local officials before the name
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change from Park View to Los Ojos was approved and finally proclaimed on

25 July 1972 at the annual San Jose Parish fiesta de Santiago. 39 A few weeks
later, the action was confirmed by a resolution of the Rio Arriba County
Board of Commissioners. 4o
hi. the final analysis, the speculative agricultural colony of Park View was
an insignificant part of the nineteenth-century development of the West. Its
brief existence and the quick dispersal of the unknown number of.settlers
who were lured there indicate that the colony had a negligible impact on the
Tierra Amarilla region. If Broad and his partners had been able to hold the
colony together a little longer, Park View might have developed into much
more than a vague historical footnote. In the spirit of nineteenth-century
Manifest Destiny, many Anglo Americans believed that places such as Tierra
Amarilla needed an infusion of white immigrants to precipitate profitable
development of the area's abundant natural resources. Men such as Wilmot
E. Broad felt strongly that colonies such as Park View were a meansto accomplish such an end. This racialized view of immigration was clearly articulated
by Lielltenant M'Cauley in his 1877 report: "That the [colony] has culminated in failure is to be greatly regretted, as until rahchmeri of American",
energy take hold of this region, its resources in an agricultural point of view
will never be developed."41
By the close of 1880, however, thefate of Broad's colony was sealed. In late
December of that year, the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad wound its way
through the mountains of southem Colorado and reached the site of presentday Chama, New Mexico; less than fifteen miles north of the Park View settlemel~t~ By this time, the colony had been, for all practical purposes, abandoned.
As the disappointed colonists scattered throughout the region, only,Broad,
Seth, and Skogg remained to participate in the subsequentburgeoning of the
timber, mining, and livestock industries that were predicted by C. S: Olmsted
four y'earsearlier.
A century passed between the time when Broad and his partners organized The New Mexic'o Stock~nd Agricultural Association and when Los
Ojos regained its original name in 1972. With the change, the one remaining vestige of Broad's colony-its name-was relegated toa vague historical
memory. Park View and its long-forgotten colonists had suffered the fate of
many nineteenth-century entrepreneurial dreams. Instead of being a place
that fulfilled the hopes of the men and women who came to New'Mexico
expecting a new and better life in the West, ,Park View became a community
whose origins remain, in Lieutenant M'Cauley's words, with many "aspects
much beclouded."42

186 ~

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 76, NUMBER 2

Notes
1. In the context of this essay, Tierra Amarilla does not refer to the present-day village
of that name. Historically, Tierra Amarilla has been a collective name for the Tierra
Amarilla land grant and its original settlements of Los 0ios, La Puente, Los Brazos,
Ensenada, and Las Nutritas. Las Nutritas's name was changed to Tierra Amarilla
when the Rio Arriba County seat was moved there in 1880. For details of the name
change activities, see Melinda Bell, "Village Gets New Name Tuesday," Espanola
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Review Essay
WILLIAM DEBUYS, SALT DREAMS:.LAND AND WATER

IN LOW-DOWN CALIFORNIA

Douglas C. Sackman

W

e may now revise Mark Twain's famous quip about the nation's arid

lands: in the West, whiskey is for drinking and water is for writing

about. Studies of western water overflow. But only a few writers, including
Mary Austin, Wallace Stegner, and Donald Worster, have written about the
subjeCt with as much insight, grace, and power as William deBuys. Salt
Dreams explores the huinan arid ecological history of the lower Colorado
River and the huinan actions that have connected the river to the Salton Sea,
a sub-sea-level place in the Iri1perial Valley where "consequences collect" (p.

13)' For deBuys, the Salton Sea o'ffers a bitter antidote to nationalistic narcissism built on the control of n~ture. Looking into the sea's troubled waters,
deBuys finds the results of dreams i.mmooredfrom ecological reaiities and
social responsibilities.
DeBuysc?ostructs an "archeology?f place" (p. 3), investigating the various strata of human endeavor and ecological action that have made and remade t,he region. In other hands, we might take this "archeology" to be a
mere figure of speech. DeBuys -shows
us the region's landforms an'd water, .
ways as a geologist and hydrologist might, and then unveils the great human

William deBuys, Salt Dreams: Land and Water in Low-Down California. Photographs by'Joan
Myers (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press; 1999. xiii + 307 pp. 100 duotones; 30
halftones, maps;notes, bibliography, index. $35.00 cloth,

ISBN

0-8263-2126-7.) Douglas C. Sack-

man is an assistant professor of history at the University of Puget Sound.
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dramas that unfolded in this geophysical scene. But the setting is no mere backdrop, for in his compelling stories people are intricately connected to place. He
describes the dynamic relationship between nature, economic motivations,
and environmental context to show how land and water changed from the sixteenth century to the present. The vast sweep of the book is impressive, although one might wish for more particulars on race and class relations in the
Imperial Valley. But that is in part because deBuys's observations are so absorbing that the reader thirsts for more.
Tracing the interrelationship of natural ecosystems, political economy, and
representations of nature has been the environmental historian's "greatest
challenge."1 Meeting this challenge remarkably well, deBuys develops a history
that pays attention as carefully to ecology as it does to ideas, while he details the
economic motivations and consequences of developments along the Colorado. DeBuys's success is perhaps most plainly apparent in his treatment ofthe
environmental and business fiasco on which his narrative centers. In 1905, the
California Development Company (CDC), which had been diverting Colorado River water into the Imperial Valley for several years, lost control of its
waterworks and sent the whole river careening off course. Rushing through a
poorly engineered intake cut, the Colorado began to flow west into the Imperial Valley rather than south to the Gulf of California. While William Smythe
envisioned the cultivation of democratic communities of yeoman farmers
through irrigation in his Conquest ofArid America (1899), Charles Rockwood
and Anthony Heber of the CDC "found a way to appropriate for private gain
the waters of a great river and to cause that water to metamorphose into title to
an inland empire" (p. 81). Yet the hubristic Rockwood, having pushed the more
competent engineer George Chaffey out of the picture, failed to understand
the power and character of the Colorado. The consequence was that his engineering works, like the financial structure of the company itself, were susceptible to devastating erosion. Ultimately, it would take the industrial muscle of
E. H. Harriman and_the Southern Pacific Company to plug the breach and
rescue the CDC and its agricultural clients in the Imperial Valley. After this
deluge, "nothing looked the same, not landscapes, institutions, politics, or
ideas" (p. 121). Here, deBuys's main theme finds striking expression: how
Anglo-American dreams of turning the desert into a garden ran aground, creating enduring consequences.
Similar to Elliott West's approach in The Contested Plains, deBuys delivers a history that is rich in ecological understanding and that takes seriously
the dreams of both Indian peoples and newcomers. Leslie Marmon Silko
also explores the gulf between perceptions about the ways and means of using
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the Colorado's waters at the turn of the century in her most recent novel,
Gardens in the Dunes. From the perspective of her Mojave and Ria C'ed
O'Odham characters, the dam's construction site is a place where "the earth
was blasted open, the soil red and moist as flesh .... The river had been forced
from her bed into deep diversion ditches, where her water ran angry red."
Mojaves worry that such damage will lead to an increase in witchcraft activity, one character lamenting that "if the river got moved, there would be no
way to keep a garden."2 Although outsiders invariably viewed the Southwest
as virgin desert land in need of improvement, Natives had considered it a
homeland and garden for hundreds ofyears. DeBuys fully recognizes that the
reclamation dreams of the newcomers devastated older established patterns
of dreaming about this land. One of his most poignant and telling stories is
of the Torres-Martinez Band of the Desert Cahuilla. In 1909, they were
awarded ten thousand submerged acres ofland in the Salton Sink by the
Department of the Interior. Government officals expected the sea to dry up
in a matter of years, but it stubbornly remained. The Cahuillas dream of
using this parcel of potential land sank under some eighty feet of water put
there by the agricultural empire that displaced and disposse'ssed them.
In 1902 Congress passed the Newlands Act, which put the government in
the business of damming and retrenching western waterways in order to
cultivate garden communities of democracy. Historians who write about
water in the West agree that this Jeffersonian dream has evaporated into thin
desert air, but they disagree sharply about the cause of its failure. Donald
Worster points to the confluence of technological, political, and economic
elements involved in controlling water in an arid land. For Worster, the CDC
fiasco showed that private interest alone is not equal to the task of managing
rivers, thus setting the stage for state intervention. Worster's state does not
march to the drumbeat of democracy but instead operates in accord with a
capitalist ethos committed to economic growth and the technological control of nature. Setting his investigation within the "larger world experience"
of manipulating water and adapting a Frankfurt school critique ofknowledge
and power, Worster compellingly describes the formation of technological
and political systems designed to dominate, rationalize, and commodify the
waters of the American West. These water works created a "hydraulic society
... a social order based on the intensive, large-scale manipulation of water
and its products in an arid setting.") Worster argues that the alchemy of capitalist enterprise and technological controlled not to the liberation of humanity from the limits of nature and to the flowering of democracy, but instead
to a social system that was as characterized by domination as was the overall
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human relationship to nature. In contrast, Norris Hundley Jr. argues that
western water development is not "the creature of a despotic and centralized
system of control," but the product of conflict and rivalry among interest
groups and federal, state, and. local governments. 4
DeBuys's treatment of the lower Colorado supports both views. The book
is full of stories about the competing visions of individuals, agencies, and
interests in the area. Although he approvingly cites Worster, deBuys seems
willing to attribute' the pattern of water development along the Colorado as
much to human foible, simple greed, and misplaced dreams as to an inexorable domination produced by the technologies and mentalities of modern
capitalism. DeBuys does not advance an overarching theory to explain the
relationship ofwater control and social power in the arid West. His approach
is more like Richard White's in The Organic Machine, where the Columbia
is portrayed as a dynamic part of nature whose banks, surface, and depths
have been criss-crossed with the nets of various groups who would make the
river's energy their own.' Salt Dreams is a marvelously rich case study confirming many of Worster's conclusions while also confirming Hundley's belief that water in the West "is a vital, finite resource over which there has been
constant struggle ... [resulting in] profound social, economic, and environmental consequences.""
The final chapters of Salt Dreams masterfully bring this triple saga of consequences up to the present. DeBuys tells the story of how developerM. Penn
Phillips and others created an alluring mirage called the "Salton Riviera" in
the early 1960s. These boosters were colorful figures, but deBuys also shows
us why their promotional schemes matter. In order to understand the interconnection between ideas of nature, economics, and ecology in this dream~
land, we need to know as much about the views of boosters as we do about
the positions of the Bureau of Reclamation or the Sierra Club. Ecologically,
the Salton Sea has become both a refuge and a danger zone. The artificial
body ofwater is a vital stomping ground for migrating birds, which havefaced
the disappearance of wetlands all along the Pacific flyway, but the salty, pollution~laden sea has also become a breeding ground for several ailments that
have caused avian die-offs of alarming proportions in recent years. DeBuys
employs an analogy to explain the current predicament: "If the Salton Sea
could be heaved up on a gurney and wheeled into the most efficient emergency room on the planet, treatment would still be slow" (p. 242). He concludes with a profound and crystalline assessment of competing dreams for the
future of the Salton Sea, including a fascinating revelation about how his own
dreams became intertwined with those of the late Sonny Bono.
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Salt Dreams is as vivid in its imagery as it is penetrating in its analysis. Like
several exceptionally revealing recent books, it is the result of collaboration
between a historian and photographer 7 Joan Myers presents two portfolios of
her portraits of the Salton Sea and the peoples who stand beside it. Her pictures are sympathetic, probing, and ask how environmental and social consequences collect in these lives and places. Myers and deBuys include no
historical photographs. The focus on the present sets the narrative and the
images into an interesting relationship; the photographs refuse to be seen as
mere illustrations ofthe words. What deBuys says of borders can be said about
the space between his written text and Myers's visual record: "The border is
a barrier across which two very different kinds of social energy arc and flash,
and the lightning that results ignites all kinds of things" (p. 176).

Salt Dreams is incandescent, brilliantly illuminating the pasts of this
complicated place and shedding considerable light on its possible futures.
Notes
1. William Cronon, "Modes of Prophecy and Production: Placing Nature in History,"
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Book Reviews

Refusing the Favor: The Spanish-Mexican Women ofSanta Fe, 1820-1880. By
Deena J. Gonzalez. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. xx + 186 pp.
Illustrations, maps, tables, notes, bibliography, index. $45.00 cloth, ISBN 0-1950 7890 - X .)
Refusing the Favor is a provocative revisionist study of Spanish-Mexican
women of Santa Fe, New Mexico. Focusing on the period between 18201880, Deena Gonzalez poses the following question: "How did the lives of
women of Santa Fe change when the United States colonized the former
Mexican North?': (p. 3),'
In formulating an answer, Gonzalez refutes the conclusion of some historians that the American conquest iI'nproved the economic and social lives of
most New Mexicans. She argues that American conquest and colonization
impoverished the majority of Hispanic New Mexicans, cost women rights
previously enjoyed under Spanish law, and made residents dependent on wage
labor controlled by Euroamericans. Gonzalez also contends that Hispanic
women remained in poverty after the conquest, as do their descendants today.
She concludes, "Accommodation to Euroamerican ways can be depicted as a
linear descent into poverty" (p. 5). In spite of their difficult situation, the
women of Santa Fe played a major role in the survival of Spanish-Mexican
culture by refusing to be colonized and dominated by Euroamericans, who
attempted to keep them at the lowest level of the new'economy and society
being created in the Southwest.

Refusing the Favor also describes women's experiences in the courts between the years 1821-1846. Although Santa Fe was not yet under American
rule, Gonzalez demonstrates the ihterference ofEuroamericans in Mexican
society. She documents the extent ofAmerican colonization among SpanishMexican women and their reactions to the American presence through their
sexual, gender, and religious identities, as well as economic motivations. The
author eloquently describes the story of dona Getruclis Barcelo, "La Tules,"
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who lived in Santa Fe during this period. Critics of La Tules as a businesswoman and saloon keeper created stereotypes that helped fuel and validate the
conquest. This misrepresentation has hidden the history of a woman who
accommodated newcomers in her saloon and contributed tothenew economy
and society of New Mexico, where Mexican and American cultures met.
While lay readers may find Gonzalez's work overpowering, academics
and specialists will find it worthy and useful. A strength of the book is its
thorough and exhaustive use of primary documents, including archival collections, census and government records, private papers, and newspapers.
Additionally, the extensive bibliography reveals the author's thorough documentation of her work.
Unfortunately, the book contains some awkwardly worded sentences that
affect the clarity of its message. Another glaring weakness, although not the
fault ofthe author, is that the font is not reader-friendly: the print is so small that
this reviewer had trouble devoting large periods of time to reading the book.
The publisher did Gonzalez a great disservice by using such a small font.
Overall, the value of Refusing the Favor lies in its fresh approach to an
emerging subject. I am sure Gonzalez's invaluable study of Spanish-Mexican
women will find itself on required reading lists of courses related to New
Mexico history, Southwest history, and Chicana/o studies.

Roy Lujan
New Mexico Highlands University

The Frontier Army hz the Settlement of the West. By Michael L. Tate. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. xx + 454 pp. Illustrations, maps,
notes, bibliography, index. $34.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3I73-X) .
Michael Tate soundly demonstrates what Francis Paul Prucha intimated
nearly fifty years ago: Col. Zachary Taylor was correct in his "1820 observation that 'the ax, pick, saw and trowel, has become more the implement of
the American soldier than the cannon, musket, or sword'" (p. 317)' Following Prucha's groundbreaking studies, Broadax and Bayonet and The Sword
of the Republic, which first described the U.S. Army's role as "purveyor of
civilization" and "agents of empire," Tate amply documents how truly "multipurpose" the army was in the nineteenth-century West. Although his conclusion may not shatter the popular image of the frontier army as a small
cadre of heroes standing between raging hostile Natives and isolated Euro-

APRIL 2001

BOOK REVIEWS ~

197

pean homesteaders, this book firmly establishes the economic, humanitarian, judicial, political, scientific, social, and technological achievements of
the U.S. Army.
Despite limited budgets, insufficient personnel, and a distrustful public, the
nineteenth-century army amassed a formidable record of se;"ice and won the
public's trust. From his earliest exploration and mapping of the trans-Mississippi West, the American soldier served as explorer, cartographer, botanist,
zoologist, geologist, artist, diplomat, meteorologist, scientist, and agricultural
and commercial developer. As increasing numbers ofAmeri,cans pushed westward, they came to rely on their military to provide a number of supplies and
services: food, medical care, weather information, blacksmithing and other
repairs, weapons and ammunition, roads and bridges, river improvements,
reservoirs, mail delivery, telegraph service, and law enforcement, in additiori
to military protection.
Although the U.S. Army's humanitarian aid to travelers and victims of
natural disasters such as the'Coeur d'Alene forest fire and the San Francisco
earthquake won friends, its protection of railroad property under order from
the Department ofWar earned the enmity of both Populist farmers and strik-,
ing workers. Whenever duty required soldiers to block civilian ambitions, the
army faced public disapproval. Communities needing basic protection from
outlaws praised troopers' efforts to fill the law-enforcement void; while other
parties vilified military actions in such conflicts as the Mormon, Lincoln
County, and Johnson County Wars. Just as timber cutters and poachers resented military protection of national parks, land-hungry settlers opposed
military protection of Native American rights and lands.
As Tate illustrates, the army's most important and popular contribution to
western development was economic. By western standards, army payrolls and
contracts provided a lush environment for town promoters, land speculators,
construction companies, woodcutters, farmers, livestock growers, merchants,
saloon operators, prostitutes, and civilian workers of all'kinds. Military funds
spread throughout local economies, spurring further development.
Although Tate gleans his overview from secondary and printed primary
sources rather than archival documents, his work fills an important void in
western military history. In breadth and depth, Tate's work is unsurpassed in
its treatm'ent of the frontier army's diverse contributions to all aspects of western development. This approach corrects the Indian-fighter image of the
western soldier. From the. road-building, gardening private to the engineering, humanitarian officer-entrepreneur, Tate has replaced the western soldier
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caricature with a living, breathing individual whose hard work and self-sacrifice spurred the settlement and development of the American West.

Michele T. Butts
Austin Peay State University

Borderlander: The Life of James Kirker, 1793-1852. By Ralph Adam Smith.
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000. ix + 326 pp. 416 illustrations,
14 maps, notes, bibliography, index. $32.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3041-5.)
Three decades ago William McGaw identified the main contours ofJames
Kirker's biography. Ralph Adam Smith has gleaned a wealth of information
from numerous hitherto unexamined Spanish-language sources for this book.
Smith uses newspaper editorials and accounts, official contracts and broadsides, and other records from Mexican and New Mexican archives to throw
new light on Kirker's southwestern adventures. "Don Santiago Querque" was
among the most enigmatic "Americans" to inhabit the pre-Mexican"American
War Southwest. Some historians label Kirker a scoundrel or worse-a profligate lowlife who murdered for money. Two lurid novels partially drawn from
Kirker's life reflect this interpretation: Mayne Reid's The Scalp Hunters (1863)
and more recently, Cormac McCarthy's Blood Meridian (1992).
An Irish immigrant to the United States, Kirker sailed on a privateer, retailed
merchandise in New York and Missouri, and trapped with the "Ashley-Henry"
brigades before relocating to Mexico in 1824. Kirker became a Mexican citizen
in 1825; by 1833 he had married a Mexican woman and started a family. At that
time, present-day New Mexico and other northern Mexican states and territories were embroiled in galling warfare with various native tribes, especially
Apaches, Navajos, and Comanches. Between 1836 and 1845, frustrated by mili~
tary failures, the governors of several states independently initiated contracts
with "foreigners," mostly Anglo-Americans and Shawnee Indians, whose quasimilitary "counter-terrorist" units operated without any direct governmental
warrant. Their job was to kill or capture hostile Indians, and they were paid
specified amounts for the scalps and captives they brought into presidios or
other locations.
Kirker followed several vocations in Mexico, each of which left ambiguities in the historical record: he traded legally and illegally with Indians,
Americans, and Mexicans; he guarded mines and mineral caravans; and he
hunted Indians. Not surprisingly, Kirker was denounced as a murderer of
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Indians (and possibly black-haired Mexicans), although he was also applauded
as an avenging angel by the beleaguered Mexicans who employed him. Smith
adds depth to Kirker's story. For example, he finds that some Mexican officers,
jealous of Kirker's successes or doubtful of the legality of his campaigns, had
him outlawed and one of his contracts cancelled. On the other hand, newspaper editorialists and citizens usually cheered when Kirker and his "scalp-hunters" rode into town, mainly because they alone had proved capable of
delivering effective blows against Mexico's internal enemies.
Although Smith appears inclined to "defend" Kirker, he exercises restraint, properly situating this figure within his time and place. For instance,
some Mexicans suspected Kirker to be a potential traitor and found apparent
confirmation when he aided the Americans during the war in 1846-1847; but
Smith argues that Kirker, aware of which way the wind was blowing, trimmed
his sails accordingly. Kirker, an intelligent and highly educated man, seems
not to have been merely a psychopathic killer. Although Smith's prose is not
exactly scintillating, he has produced a detailed narrative biography of an
important-if unsavory-American immigrant to Mexico who spent many'
years in the borderlands where law was illusory, allegiances were at best
conditional, and many moral indices of savagery and civility had blurred into
meaninglessness.
Barton H. Barbour
National Park Service

Bones, Boats, and Bison: Archeology and the First Colonization ofWestem
North America. By E. James Dixon. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000. xiv + 322 pp. Illustrations, maps, tables, bibliography, index.
$49.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8263-2°57-0.24.95 paper, ISBN 0-8263-2138-0.)
Bones, Boats, and Bison fits perfectly into the classic studies of culture
history by Americanist archaeology. Dixon identifies prehistoric traditions
and complexes over time and space using primarily projectile point
typologies and associated assemblages. The first nine chapters provide a review of the early occupation of the Americas, and the final chapter advances
Dixon's theory regarding the peopling of North and South America.
The book begins with a historical review of paleoindian archaeology in
North America. The first chapter gives the reader a context for paleoindian
studies beginning in the 1920S and 1930S. This section of the text introduces
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the reader to the climate of initial archaeological discovery and the gradual
realization of great human antiquity in North America. Dixon then describes
a suite of diverse topics often related to the origins of humans in the Americas, briefly introducing the role of DNA studies, J. H. Greenberg's linguistic
model,C. G. Turner's dental research, and the Bering Land Bridge hypothesis. These are the same topics explained in David Meltzer's article from the
inaugural issue of Evolutionary Anthropology (1993, 1:157-69). Interestingly,
Dixon does not cite the Meltzer paper. The primary purpose of this section
is to introduce the reader to Dixon's hypothetical sequence for the colonization of the Americas (Figure 2.7), with which he closes the book in the final
chapter.
In chapters three and four Dixon reviews important sites older than 11,5°0
B.P. in North America, Mexico, Central America, and South America. In
these chapters he tabulates the sites using Meltzer's (1993) minimal criteria:
(1) indisputable human remains or human made artifacts; (2) good stratigraphic context; (3) radiometric dating; and (4) good environmental context.
All of the early sites were evaluated against these simple but stringent criteria. Dixon notes that humans were well established in the Americas prior to
11,500 B.P. In chapter five Dixon reviews the context for human remains older
than 8,000 B.P., providing general characteristics of the thirty-eight known
individuals with regard to sex, age at time of death, stature, age of remains,
and burial association (Table 5.1). Dixon devotes the second half of his book
to the early history of western North American cultures.
Chapter six is a short introduction to Dixon's definition and use of the
terms "tradition" and "complex." He elaborates on these definitions by introducing projectile-point typologies, noting that traditions and complexes can
be recognized by changes in technologies, particularly in projectile points.
The following chapters review the traditions and complexes of western North
America by describing a few important sites and noting the diagnostic material culture for each case. In the final chapter he confidently rules out the
"ice-free" corridor as a migration route used by the first people in the Americas and presents his coastal migration theory.
In general this book does a fine job of reviewing the available information
on the peopling ofthe Americas and comes up with a hard-to-beat conclusion.
Some readers might criticize Dixon for simply stating what appears to be a wellrecognized migration route. However, no one prior to Dixon has amassed the
data to support the coastal migration theory. I am grateful for Dixon's detailed
review of the culture history of the pre-11,50o B.P. occupations and the early
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human remains, and for his review of the poorly published Alaskan materials.

Bones, Boats, and Bison is the most comprehensive review of pre-8,ooo

B.P.

culture history in the Americas to date and is well worth reading.
William Andrefsky Jr.
Washington State University

Great Towns and Regional Polities in the Prehistoric American Southwest and
Southeast. Edited by Jill E. Neitzel. (Albuquerque: UniversitY of New Mexico Press, 1999. xxii + 325 pp. 93 illustrations, charts, maps, tables, bibliography, index. $45.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8263-2001-5.)

Great Towns and Regional Polities in the Prehistoric American Southwest
and Southeast originated from papers given' at an archaeology conference in
1992 and at a seminar organized by the volume's editor in 1994. The purpose
of these gatherings and of the book that followed was to present a multiscalar
comparison of the prehistoric Native American cultures of the Southwest
and Southeast from A.D. 900 until European contact in the 15oos. The book's
multiscalar approach proceeds from studies of several levels - towns, regions,
and even continentwide interactions. Three chapters are devoted to each
scale of analysis, one each by a specialist on the Southwest and the Southeast,
and a third in collaboration between the two specialists for comparison.
The first three chapters admirably sum up what is known about the towns
of the prehistoric Southwest and Southeast. The authors of the second trio
of chapters analyze the complexity of polities in both regions. The third trio
of chapters, dealing with the organization ·of polities, is less successful. The
chapter on southwestern polity organization concentrates too much on
theoretical problems and the history of archaeology, and ultimately has little
to say about the question·it is supposed to answer. The chapter on southeastern polity organization is a much better attempt to answer the question at
hand, but this group of chapters is thrown out of balance by its weak chapter
on the Southwest.
In contrast, the next trio of chapters, dealing with macroregions, is perhaps the best in the book. The chapter on the Southwest offers a good account of the Hohokam macroregional ball court system, as well as perhaps
the best explanation to date for the "Chaco phenomenon." The chapter dealing with the Southeast is an equally intriguing examination of macroregional
systems in that region.
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Chapter thirteen stands alone as a comparison of Mesoamerican influences on the Southwest and Southeast. A further trio of chapters sums up
previous ones by offering multiscalar descriptions of both regions. Two final
chapters deal with what can be learned from a comparison of the prehistoric
Southwest and Southeast.
The authors make several important points throughout the book and particularly in the final chapters. One is that the late prehistoric Southeast encompassed only one cultural tradition, the Mississippian. The Southwest in the
same period included several cultures, such as the Anasazi, Hohokam, and
Mogollon, which are markedly different from each other. Another point concerns differing research traditions. For example, archaeologists ofthe Southeast
have been more willing to project modern ethnographic and ethnohistorical
evidence on the past than have their colleagues studying the Southwest.
Perhaps the most important point of discussion is that the Southwest and
Southeast do not fit equally well into the traditional neoevolutionary classification of societies into bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states. Southeastern
societies offer abundant evidence of social ranking and competition among
individuals for political primacy, and southeastern archaeologists generally
have no trouble classifying such polities as chiefdoms. Southwestern archaeologists do not accept the "chiefdom" label so easily, for they lack evidence
for powerful elites and social ranking. At different points in the book, southwestern specialists offer the terms group-oriented chiefdoms, communities,
and ritualities to describe the complex societies of the Hohokam and Chaco.
The authors conclude that scholars need to stop trying to fit every society into
the neoevolutionary hierarchy and to realize that "middle-range" societies
may develop along various lines that do not necessarily lead to state formation. In such discussions, the authors of Great Towns and Regional Polities
show how archaeologists are learning to reconstruct ancient social structures,
using theory where it helps our understanding, and discarding or rethinking
it where it falls short.

Gary Van Va/en
University of New Mexico
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Sex, Sexuality, and the Anthropologist. Edited by Fran Markowitz and Michael
Ashkenazi. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999. 230 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $34-95 cloth, ISBN 0-252-02437-0, $18,95 paper, ISBN 0-252-06747-9.)
This collection breaks the silence surrounding the sexuality ofthe anthropologist. The essays advance the discussion of sexual experiences, their implications, and the theoretical applications made possible by overtly "sexing
the field." The authors begin with the notion that silence is antithetical to
understanding the"exotic Other." By problematizing the "naturalness" of the
cultures from which anthropologists come, the essays grapple with a range
of sexual analytics that contest anthropology's historical proclivity to ignore
sexuality. After all, kinship, alliance, and marriage are not equivalent to sex
and sexualities. From critiques of prudish, orthodox data gathering techniques to the more radical stance of advocating sex as a "research method"
(p. 185), each essay invokes a similar sentiment: without engaging a subject
intimately, how can we "know" it?
The intent of the collection is to focus attention on the sexuality ofanthropologists. By focusing on the anthropologists' experiences, however, the essays tend to ignore how the relationships with anthropologists may affect
informants. Privileging the anthropologist's interpretation of"love" as useful
in the field does not give the reader access to the dynamic dimensions of sex
and power relationships. The geographic settings of the essays are wide range
ing, with only one piece focused on Latin America. Conducting research in
Mexico, Michael Winkelman uses a psychodynamic approach to argue that
researchers are more prone to enter relationships with locals who share a class
and educational background similar to that of the researcher and who are less
a part of "traditional" culture. This theory contradicts many contemporary
anthropologists' insistence that there is no such thing as a "traditional" cultural form but rather many articulations of what "tradition" and "culture"
mean in various contexts. Winkelman's discussion would have benefited
from recent critiques of stereotypes such as the "marian" Mexican woman
and the "macho" Mexican man. Relying on these old tropes does a disservice
to the complex sexualized situation Winkelman describes.
Perhaps because of the relative newness ofthis topic, these essays offer a
range ofperspectives, some more useful than others, often oscillating between
titilating reading and more serious methodological concerns. For example,
Chao.'s study of Taiwanese lesbian culture clearly requires an in-depth analysis and engagement with sexuality, while in other essays it is not clear why
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descriptions of sexual liaisons are relevant to the ethnographic analysis. For
instance, a professor's description of his sexual relationship with his "beautiful
blond" (p. 57) undergraduate student appears to reify a potential abuse ofpower
rather than make it a subject of examination. None of the essays address crossgenerational sex, relations with prostitutes, and other forms of sexuality that
may be too scandalous for publication. The collection thus maintains selected
silences of its own, reflecting a particular sensibility ofwhat is and is not appropriate to reveal. Overall, each of the essays proclaim that sexuality must be
"managed deliberately" (p. 90) - a position that is provocatively undertaken
throughout this collection and that deserves further discussion.
Alyssa Cymene Howe
University of New Mexico

Breakdown: How the Secret of the Atomic Bomb Was Stolen During World
War II. By Richard Melzer. (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: Sunstone Press, 2000.160 pp.

Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $16,95 paper,

ISBN

0-86534-3°4-7.)

Breakdown provides a brief but engaging history of how Soviet agents stole
the secrets of the atomic bomb. Written in three chapters with the terse titles
of "Theory," "Practice," and "Proof," the book relates the breakdown of security surrounding the supersecret atomic bomb project.
In chapter one, Melzer skillfully lays out the various means the Army established to ensure the integrity and loyalty of personnel assigned to the Manhattan Project. In theory, these methods- background checks, security
clearances, document classification, and c'ompartmentalization - appeared
to establish a,"leakproof" barrier around the atomic bomb project.
As Melzer shows in chapter two, however, security practices often failed
to meet theoretical ideals of security. The breakdown of security at Los Alamos occurred as the result of decisions made by both J. Robert Oppenheimer, the director of the laboratory, and Gen. Leslie Groves, the military head
of the Manhattan Project. In order to ensure successful completion of the
project in the shortest time, Oppenheimer and Groves allowed relaxation of
rules in three key areas: security clearances, access to information, and travel
restrictions. In turn, Soviet moles on "The Hill" exploited these weaknesses
through espionage. Melzer illustrates how the brilliant mathematician Richard Feynman pursued a side career of exposing failures within the security
network, although his warnings repeatedly fell on deaf ears.
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In chapter three, Melzer briefly sketches how the three identified Soviet
agents-Klaus Fuchs, Theodore Hall, and David Greenglass-managed to
become Project Y members, gain access to vital materials, and travel offsite
to meet with contacts who transferred the secre.t information to the Soviet
Union. With.these secrets, Soviet scientists successfully built and detonated
an atomic bomb, a-copycat version of the Trinity/Nagasaki device in late
August 1949.
Anyone interested in the history ofthe atomic bomb will gain much from
Melzer's fine treatment of the failure of wartime security and the loss of
atomic secrets. In light of recent allegations about Chinese espionage directed against Los Alamos, readers will gain an appreciation for the deep
roots and causes of such activities: This is a highly readable and recommended book.
Scott D. Hughes
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Enduring Cowboys: Life in the New Mexico Saddle. Edited by Arnold Vigil.
(Santa Fe: New Mexico Magazine, 1999. 151 pp. Illustrations, bibliography.
$38.95 cloth, ISBN o-9372-o658-x.)
In keeping with New Mexico Magazine's tradition of documenting cowboys and the ranching industry in the state, Arnold Vigil has gathered vignettes, essays, and· photographs that illustrate the cowboy culture's
prominent place in all New Mexican cultures. The book achieves this task
by discussing the issues facing cowboys and ranchers in a new era - technology and the environment, the monopoly of the meatpacking industry, and
battles over land use. The authors distinguish between rancher and cowboy,
the former being businessmen and the latter, their workers.
The entries include Michael Miller's essay on the vaqueros and their prepotent legacy in vocabulary and lore, Conroy Chinoy's reflections on Native
American cowboys, and a reprint of Jack Sinclair's piece, "Bowlegs." Steve
Terrell's chapter on the legendary cowboy reminds us that New Mexico's
landscape contributed to the creation of the celluloid cowboy and adds that
Leonard Slye's car broke down in Magdalena in 1930 before he was Roy
Rogers, the king of cowboys. Profiles and photographs of cowboys and ranchers reveal their family histories, their involvement in livestock work, and their
possibilities in the future. Three-time governor of New Mexico Bruce King

206 ~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 76, NUMBER 2

is the subject of an essay, as well as former African American slave George
Mcjunkin, the cowboy who discovered Folsom Site.

Enduring Cowboys is valuable as oral and cultural history. The book
contains reminiscences that inform our knowledge of the recent past. The
collection is also an indication of where New Mexico ranching is today. Of
those subjects interviewed, two-thirds derive income outside the ranching
industry. Family is a high priority for these people, and they value the
ranching lifestyle.
This reader wishes that the writing about ranching work, including what
Tom McGuane calls "the enchantment of horsemanship," were less pedestrian. Also, the parameters of the interviews should have been flexible enough
to illuminate the subjects more. For instance, the composure of Datil's Bob
Lee on foot or horseback approaches Zen. The gravitas ofSan Jon's Julie Pound
Gates comes from years of hard work as a number-one son, although she is the
oldest ofthree girls. And Magdalena's Tony Tru j illo can start a conversation by
declaring that your horse "ain't proud cut."
While many New Mexico cowboys and ranchers remain hopeful and
determined about the future of their work, Bruce King comments that New
Mexico is running out of cowboys fast (p. 149)' Charles Good asks, "If small
ranchers go out of business, who's going to take over?" (p. 122). Art Evans of
Cuchillo has worked as a consultant for Ted Turner on the Ladder Ranch,
a holding backed by Turner's turbo-financed media empire. That kind of
money and tax savvy beside a hard scrabble outfit raises another deeply affecting issue. That is the book's larger concern, the survival of New Mexico's
cowboys and ranchers in the economy of "McWorld."
Nancy Coggeshall
Reserve, New Mexico

Pancho Villa's Revolution by Headlines. By Mark Cronlund Anderson. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000. xi + 301 pp. Illustrations, notes,
bibliography, index. $34.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3172-1.)
Mark Anderson's new study ofVillista propaganda is an interesting examination of a novel topic. Pancho Villa's Revolution by Headlines is well-written and solidly researched. The latter quality is particularly evident in the
author's familiarity with Mexican archives.
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The book also raises some questions. For example, was Villa manipulating the press, or vice versa? Are the quotations Anderson attributes to Villa
what he really said, or are these items simply loose translations? The author
minimizes use oftheoretical language, but his attempt to employ an "agendasetting" model sputters.
The book's title is partly inappropriate, for there is a great deal of material
on Villa's rivals, Victoriano Huerta, and Venustiano Carranza. I have no
quibble with Anderson's conclusions about Huerta, and the author notes
correctly that the Carrancista press was ineffective from 1913-1914 but useful
from 1915-1920. Also, the author accurately states that for Carranza, "the right
thing for him seldom resembled America's self-interest"(p. 114)' Therefore it
is surprising to read that Carranza adopted a policy of"rhetorical friendship"
with the United States after 1915. In reality, Carranza consistently contested
President Woodrow Wilson and never revoked his nationalistic decrees.
Anderson points out that Villa favored the United States far more than any
other Mexican faction did during the 1910-1920 civil war. However, Villa's
strong support for the US. was not exactly "brilliant" despite the author's
contention (p. 32). Certainly Villa's pro-American stance did not keep his
enemies "at bay," for it cost him the support of many potential followers (p.

44)' After Villa backed Wilson's seizure of Veracruz in 1914, the Villistas
could not claim that they were nationalists, although the author maintains
that Villa was nationalistic and pro-US. at the same time.
Villa may have lost out in his bid for power, but Anderson makes a convincing argument that the Villistas won the propaganda war. Villa befriended
journalists such as John Reed as well as American filmmakers and diplomats.
Prior to the Columbus, New Mexico, raid of 1916, many observers tended to
view Villa as an earthy warrior for democratic reform. Anderson points out
that Villa's early military success was the real reason his propaganda became
effective. In addition, newspapers that had predicted Villa's victory became
reluctant to admit their error.
The book has excellent illustrations, particularly a selection of contemporary editorial cartoons. Unfortunately, the author says almost nothing about
the 1916-1920 period when the weakened Villa was still on the warpath. Also,
the author could have compared U.S. press coverage to what European newspapers wrote. Anderson's discussion of US. racism towards Mexico does not
produce any new insights. Although the Mexican context is somewhat elusive and major writers such as John Reed do not receive much attention, this
study is an interesting addition to the historiography of Mexico. In years to
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come, scholars will use Anderson's work as the standard study of propaganda
during the Mexican Revolution.
Douglas W. Richmond
University ofTexas at Arlington

Refried Elvis: The Rise ofMexican Counterculture. By Eric Zolov. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999. xiii + 349 pp. Illustrations, tables, graphs,
notes, bibliography, index. $45.00 cloth,
ISBN

ISBN

0-520-26866-8, $18,95 paper,

0-520-21514-1.)

In this excellent study, Eric Zolov captures the enthusiasm surrounding
the early years of Mexican rock; but Refried Elvis is not one of those "Behind
the Music," VH-l-like documentaries: Instead, Zolov explores the internal
struggle and crisis surrounding the entry of rock music and the counterculture into Mexico. Zolov describes rock as a "wedge and mirror of rapid modernization," and he shows how Mexican rocanrol (y toda la des madre) was
controversial. He argues that rock was "a signifier of cosmopolitan values and
a bearer of disorder and wanton individualism" (p. 11). Zolov examines all
aspects of the counterculture - music, literature, and social protests-to
show the quixotic response of Mexican institutions to modernity. The revolutionary family was growing up and leaving the paternal nest, and the government, as well as opposition parties, censors, advertisers, and parent groups
were trying to ascertain exactly what to do.
Zolov's work is ambitious and serious. To document the influence and rise
of the counterculture, he employs a wide array of materials: film, interviews,
lyrics, music, photos, propaganda, radio programs, and printed material. The
author documents the changing attitudes and nature of Mexican society. By
the 1960s, young people were no longer content with traditional Mexican
music; they sought something that expressed the social and political turmoil
they were experiencing. Interestingly, Zolov notes that the counterculture
began to flourish during the presidential administration ofPRI (Institutional
Revolutionary Party) conservative Gustavo Dfaz Ordaz (1964-1970).
While Dfaz Ordaz was successful in stifling young peoples' political and
social demands, he never completely squelched rocanrol, youth culture, and
the emerging counterculture, la onda. Zolov describes la onda as "an antisocial social movement"(p. 177)' He quotes Mexican cultural critic Jose Agustin,
who elaborated that la onda "was a common, youthful, universal, authentic,
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and spontaneous spirit that allows kids to converge around rock music in order
to organize for a qualitative change ofsociety" (p. 177)' Zolov argues that, in the
wake of the October 1968 massacre in Tlatelolco, la onda became a means for
youth to vent their rage over the massacred student movement.
Zolov found that the voices of discontented youth ofthe 1960s continued in
music. Consequently, promoters and advertisers saw the potentiallucrative
nature of a "rock venture." These efforts to market la onda to the masses became known as la onda chicana. However, la onda chicana - original Mexican
rock-was short-lived, lasting from late 1970 to early 1972. Zolov explains that
a backlash against la onda chicana began in the wake of the Avendar6 rock
festival in 1971, Mexico's Woodstock. The right as well as the left criticized the
festival and the music for being imperialistic, corruptive, and antinationalistic.
Perhaps, for the right, rock music questioned the revolutionary family; and for
the left, it appeared too influenced by the United States. Zolov argues, however, that the criticism grew because la onda chicana had the capability of becoming a political force outside traditional political parties. Youth from all
classes came together at concerts. Zolov writes, "Rock 'organized' people-or
at least presented an opportunity for organizing-and proved it could do so,
however tenuously, across class lines" (p. 217)' With renewed energy, President
Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) succeeded where his conservative predecessor
never could. This posturing left-priista squashed la onda chicana and opened
the way for more United States and European influence.
Obviously, Mexican rock continued and still continues. Zolov concludes
by noting that today "the identification between rock music and democratic
politics goes almost without question in opposition circles" (p. 257). While
reading this significant study, I reflected upon a Cafe Tacuba concert I attended in Detroit last fall. The venue was small, with maybe two hundred
people in the crowd. Amidst the yells of jviva chilangotitl6n! the band played
for two and one-half hours while the crowd continued to grow. A few months
later, I read about Cafe Tacuba's free concert' in the Z6colo attended by tens
of thousands. Granted, last fall in a basement of an old converted church in
the Midwest of the United States, the crowd was small, but like their peers
in the Z6colo, they were enthusiastic. Mexican rock, as a form of social criticism and cultural expression, has a growing audience on both sides of the Rio
Grande. Zolov shows that its entrenchment in Mexico was tumultuous, but
now audiences and listeners relish jtoda la desmadre!
Elaine Carey
University of Detroit
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Technology and Competitiveness in Mexico: An Industrial Perspective. By
Thomas

J. Botzman. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1999. xi

+157 pp. Tables, figures, bibliography, index. $49'00 cloth,
3, $27-50 paper,

ISBN

ISBN

0-7618-1371-

0-7618-1372-1.)

Thomas J. Botzman presents a succinct analysis of the dynamic transformations in Mexico's industrial infrastructure over the last decade. He evaluates how Mexico's economy has responded to recent international trade
agreements, arguing that, to further the nation's industrial competitiveness,
Mexico must improve its research, training, and application of technology.
According to Botzman, Mexico's adoption of the import substitution
model of development "retarded the creation of technology rich pockets in
the Mexican industrial sector" (p.13)' As a consequence Mexico failed to
utilize the energy, "cooperative linkages," and capital to expand its research,
development, and use of technology. He maintains that poor education and
training programs, relatively few students in engineering and technology
programs, and a weak relationship between academia and industry in research and development have thwarted the widespread application of technology in Mexico. The author also points to broader problems such as the
"small size of the firm [s], the lack of capital ... and the protection of the
domestic market," all of which impeded the development of an infrastructure that "values training programs" (p. 71).
Although these weaknesses have hampered the growth of Mexico's
economy, Botzman observes important changes in the nation's industry. He
conducted case studies of Mexico's textile and apparel, petrochemical, plastics, steel, and automobile industries, demonstrating how these sectors have
pursued development strategies to meet their respective needs. For example,
international competition, improved research and development programs,
increased privatization of Mexico's firms, joint ventures with international
companies, and improved training programs have enhanced the competitiveness of these industries.
Botzman provides a timely analysis of the substantive changes taking
place in Mexico's economic growth and development in the last decade and
concludes that Mexico's future appears bright. His target audience is development and government officials and academics studying the relationship
between Mexico's technological development and sustained economic
growth. As a result, he employs technological jargon that nonspecialists may
find distracting. This is a minor complaint, however, and should not detract
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from Botzman's careful explanation of the changes occurring in Mexico as
it transforms into a "first world" industrial player.

J.

Burton Kirkwood

University of Evansville

United States-Latin American Relations, 1850-1903: Establishing a Relationship. Edited by Thomas M. Leonard. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press, 1999. 303 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $44.95 cloth,

ISBN

0-8173-

°937-3,)
Standard histories of United States-Latin American relations rarely capture the great diversity and complexity of policy issues that confronted US.
and Latin American diplomats in the nineteenth century. Framed by Thomas M. Leonard's br·ief introductory overview of US. expansionism, foreign
policy doctrines, European threats, pan-American conferences, and Latin
America's integration into the international e.conomy, this edited collection
is an exception. Accomplished and well-known specialists on specific countries offer readers essays that recount the domestic and geopolitical factors
influencing the foreign policies of Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, Central America, Venezuela, Peru,'Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay from the
mid-nineteenth century to 1903.
With one exception, the authors of these country studies have published
various books on interamerican relations and monographs on the countries
covered. Perhaps with this in mind, the editor has given the contributors,
methodological, substantive; and stylistic latitude. All ofthe authors draw from
diplomatic correspondence, secondary monographic materials, and specialized articles, but vary considerably in their use of other historical sources such
as newspapers, memoirs, personal correspondence, government archives, and
b~lsiness records. Most take the reader back nearly to independence in the early
1800s, but the attention they give to events of the first half of the century varies.
Likewise, the tone of the articles ranges from William Sater's wit and sarcasm
to Joseph Smith's straightforward narrative.
Leonard intends for the country specialists' essays to demonstrate the
range of issues and degrees of importance U.S. diplomats attached to relationships with several Latin American countries. While Mexico and Cuba·
demanded continuous US. attention from the early nineteenth century,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay were "countries on the periphery of its na-
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tional interests" (p, 8). In accord with this deliberate focus on diversity in
international relations, there is no common framework for the diplomatic
stories told by the authors, no shared framework for analysis, and no easy way
to generalize from the country essays about u.s. diplomatic relations with
Latin America from 1850 to 1903. Indeed, the editor emphasizes that the
United States did not have consistent policies toward the region, "save the
goal of protecting private entrepreneurs threatened by local political crises."
He also stresses thatthe Latin American view of U.S. policies was far from
uniform, except for a growing mistrust of the United States as "imperialist"
after the Mexican-American War and, later, the interventions in Cuba,
Colombia, the Caribbean, and Central America (p. 9)'
Leonard's ten-page introduction is followed by historical accounts of U.S.
diplomatic relations with individual countries and ofthose countries' foreign
policies from the early nineteenth century until almost World War I. In each
case, foreign policies are related to domestic, regional, and international circumstances as well as to the particulars of U.S. bilateral policies. Taken together, the essays provide a synopsis of national histories and diplomatic
issues, but the volume's success in demonstrating diversity makes difficult
connecting thematically the individual historical accounts. Readers jump
from topic to topic: the U.S. role in Porfirian economic development in Mexico; the annexationist debate over Cuba; commercial claims and the Panamanian issue in Colombia; concern with British interest in Central America;
wars and claims in Venezuela; Secretary of State James Blaine's policies and
the War of the Pacific in Peru; and Argentina's and Chile's "clash of global
visions" with the United States.
The collection's emphasis on the variation in U.S. foreign policy in nineteenth-century Latin America inevitably presents the tension between traditional diplomatic history and the desire of specialists in international relations
and comparative politics for some effort to make more general sense of the
individual cases. In this instance, sufficient previous work such as Peter Smith,
Talons ofthe Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (1996) and
Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History ofU.S. Policy Toward Latin
America (1998), (neither of which appears in the select bibliography) exists to
justify, at the least, asking questions about regional patterns and explanations
for the diversity that go beyond the brief introduction to this volume. Are there
no discernible patterns tous. use of military force in Latin America between

1850 and 1903, to U.S. diplomatic initiatives in the cases of intrahemispheric
wars, or to U.S. recognition policy? How did changing interpretations of the
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Monroe Doctrine from 1823 to 1903 affect relations between Latin America,
the United States, and European nation states? Did the influence of racism
and racialism underlying U.S. policies vary from Mexico to the Southern
Cone? Do the case studies shed any light on these or other issues of interamerican relations in the nineteenth century?
Beyond these more obvious questions, is there anything of value in the
cultural histories of United States-Latin American relations and the more
recent postmodernist approaches (Frederick Pike, The United States and
Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes ofCivilization and Nature [1992]; Gilbert Joseph et a!. eds., Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural
History of U.S.-Latin American Relations [1998]) for understanding the case
material? A concluding chapter that considers comparative issues gleaned
from the case studies and more recent approaches to interamerican relations
would have made the volume even more useful for the reader and for the
university classroom without abandoning the defensible commitment to
idiographic country cases.
Brian Loveman
San Diego State University

Populism in Latin America. Edited by Michael L. Conniff, foreword by John
D. Wirth. (Tuscaloosa: University ofAlabama Press, 1999. viii + 243 pp. Illustrations, tables, notes, bibliographic essay, index. $44.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8173-

0959-4, $22·50 paper, ISBN 0-8173-°970-5).
"Give me

a balcony

and I will make myself President," proclaimed

Ecuador's populist leader Jose Marfa Velasco Ibarra. This pithy claim captures much of the spirit of presidential ism in Latin America from about 1930
to 1960, the theme of this useful and comprehensive book of essays by a group
of leading historians of twentieth-century Latin American politics.
This collection includes essays by Joel Horowitz (Argentina), Michael
Conniff (Brazil), Paul Drake (Chile), Jorge Basurto (Mexico), Steve Stein
(Peru), Steve Ellner (Venezuela), Ximena Sosa-Buchholtz (Ecuador), and
William Francis Robinson (Panama). Two general essays complete the compilation: one on the legacies of populism and its endurance into the current
age by Kurt Weyland and another exploring the frontiers for future research
by Conniff. The editors also include a useful bibliographic essay. For those
wanting to explore the internal debates, causes, and typologies of populism,
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the notes and final essays are useful guides. The only gaps are essays on
Colombia and Cuba. In these two very suggestive countries, early experiments in populist government were aborted, leading to endemic violence
and revolution.
This book has a clear orientation that focuses on populist leaders. The
authors do discuss ideologies, popular culture, and even the social constituencies that backed populist regimes, but such issues, the subject of more
recent research in this field, occupy the background in the narratives of these
chapters. This collection concentrates on leadership and formal political
institutions. The governments of the post-193° years were in some sense a
striking reversal of the efforts during the previous period (1870-1930) to depersonalize politics. On the whole, Latin America between 1870 and 1930
saw rotating elected presidents, the emergence of competitive parties, and
some form ofliberal constitutionalism. After 1930, this system broke down in
favor of a more personalized and only quasi-institutional type of government,
relying, as Conniff notes in his capstone essay, on the power of charismatic
leadership. The personalization of authority and the intimate bond between
leaders and subjects constitute the central theme of this book.
The essays share several conclusions. The first is the constantly shifting
social alliances behind the populist governments and their difficulty in adjusting to changing circumstances. By the early 1950S, populist governments
were in trouble everywhere. Some governments muddled through difficult
situations, others collapsed right away. One wonders just how "consolidated"
this type of regime actually was. The second common conclusion is the association of populism with changing notions of "the people" - a citizenry
endowed with a new generation of rights - especially rights to bargain collectively for housing, decent wages, and the like. The authors suggest that there
was a clear correlation between populism and emerging definitions of citizenship and of the rights that flow from membership in the political community. Some populist leaders, but by no means all, relied on nationalist appeals
to realize these new claims.

Populism in Latin America is a fine ancluseful book, especially for students
needing introductions and background to the themes of this period in Latin
American history.
Jeremy Adelman
Princeton University

Book Notes

American Indian Cooking: Recipes from the Southwest. By Carolyn Niethammer, foreword by Ann Woodin. Originally published as American Indian
Food and Lore. (New York: Collier Macmillian, 1974; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999. xxxii + 191 pp. Halftones, illustrations, map,
notes, bibliography, indexes. $14.95 paper,

ISBN

0-8032-8375-X.)

American Indian Lacrosse: Little Brother of War. By Thomas Vennum Jr.
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994. xvi + 360 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $21.95 paper, ISBN 1~56098-302-7.)
Anasazi Legends: Songs ofthe Wind Dancer. By Lou Cuevas. (Happy Camp,
Calif.: Naturegraph Publishers, 2000. 206 pp. Illustrations. $12.95 paper, ISBN
0-87961-256-8. )

Away Games: The Life and Times of a Latin Baseball Player. By Marcos
Breton and Jose Luis Villegas. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 2000. xvi + 272 pp. Halftones, notes, bibliography, index. $15.95 paper,
ISBN

0-8263-2232-8.)

Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in War from Prehistory to the Present. By
Linda Grant De Pauw. (1998; reprint, Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2000. xvii + 395 pp. Halftones, notes, bibliography, index. $17.95 paper,
ISBN

0-8061-3288-4.)

Black Society in Spanish Florida. By Jane Landers, foreword by Peter H.
Wood. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999. xiv + 390 pp. 21 halftones,
6line drawings, maps, tables, appendixes, notes: index. $50.00 cloth, ISBN 0252-02446-x, $19.95 paper,

ISBN

0- 252-06 753-3.)

Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics. By A.
Costandina Titus. 2d. ed., Nevada Studies in History and Political Science.
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(Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2001. xvi + 242 pp. Halftones, illustrations,
maps, notes, bibliography, index. $21.95 paper,

ISBN

0-87417-370-1.)

Chicano Culture, Ecology, Politics: Subversive Kin. Edited by Devon G.
Pena. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998. xii + 316 pp. Map, notes,
bibliography, index. $40.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8165-1872~6, $19.95 paper, ISBN 08165-1873-4. )
Crazy Horse: A Photographic Biography. By Bill and Jan Moeller. (Missoula,
Mont.: Mountain Press Publishing Company, 2000. ix + 157 pp. 104 color
photographs, map, bibliography, index. $20.00 paper, ISBN 0-87842C424-5.)
Desert Honkytonk: The Story of Tombstone's Birdcage Theatre. By Roger A.
Bruns. (Golden, Colo.: Fulcrum Publishing, 2000. viii + 199 pp. Halftones,
notes, bibliography, index. $17.95 paper, ISBN 1-55591-416-0.)
The First South Americans: The Peopling of a Continent from the Earliest
Evidence to High Culture. By Daniele Lavallee, translated by Paul G. Bahn.
Originally published as Promesse d' Amerique: La prehistoire de l' Amerique
du Sud. (1995; reprint, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2000. xii + 260
pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $25.00 paper, ISBN 087480-665-8.)
Guide to Rock Art ofthe Utah Region: Sites with Public Access. By Dennis Slifer.
(Santa Fe: Ancient City Press, 2000. ix + 245 pp. 16 color photographs, 152 illustrations, 40 maps, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. $15.95 paper, ISBN
1-58096-009-X. )
Human 'Impact on Ancient Environments. By Charles L. Redmen. (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1999. xiv + 239 pp. Illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. $45.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8165-1962-5, $22.95 paper, ISBN 0-8165-1963-3.)
Musica Tejana: The Cultural Economy ofArtistic Transformation. By Manuel
Pena. University of Houston Series in Mexican American Studies, no.

I.

(Col-

lege Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999. xii + 239 pp. Halftones, selected discography, bibliography, index. $27.95 cloth,

$15.95 paper,

ISBN

ISBN

0-89096-877-2,

0-89096-888-8.)

New Mexico's Historic Places: The Guide to National and State Register Sites.
Edited by Marci L. Riskin, foreword by Robert J. Torrez. Adventure Roads
Travel Series. (Santa Fe: Ocean Tree Books, 1999. 160 pp. Halftones, maps,
index. $15.95 ISBN 0-943734-40-1.)
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North American Cattle-Ra11ching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiation. By Terry G. Jordan. Histories ofthe American Frontier Series. (1993; reprint,
Albuquerque: University ofNew Mexico Press, 2000. xi + 493 pp. 53 illustrations,
12 maps, notes, bibliography, index. $24.95 paper, ISBN 0-8263-1422-8.)

Notable Men and Women of Spanish Texas. By Donald E. Chipman and
Harriett Denise Joseph. (Austin: University ofTexas Press, 1999. xvi +359 pp.
Halftones, 9line drawings, 11 maps, notes, bibliography, index. $40.00 cloth,
ISBN

0-292-71217-0, $17.95 paper, ISBN 0-292-71218-9.)

The Photographs of Alfred Stieglitz: Georgia O'Keefe's Enduring Legacy.
Edited by Therese Mulligan. (Rochester, NY: George Eastman House,
2000. v + 121 pp. 40 color plates, 20 duotone, 200 illustrations, essays, notes,
photographic catalogue. $29.95 paper, ISBN 0-935398-23-6.)

Remembrance and the Design ofPlace. By Frances Downing. Sara and John
Lindsey Series in the Arts and Humanities, no. 6. (College Station: Texas
A&M University Press, 2000.' vii + 187 pp. 37 line drawings, appendixes, notes,
index. $39.95 cloth, ISBN 0-89096-922-1.)

Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America. Edited by Thomas W. Walker and Ariel C. Armony. Latin America Silhouettes
Series. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2000. xxvi + 301 pp. Map,
charts, tables, notes, bibliography, index. $60.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8420-2766-1,
$22.95 paper, ISBN 0-8420-2768"8.)

The San Sabel Mission: Spanish Pivot in Texas. By Robert S. Weddle, drawings by Mary Nabers Prewit. (1964; reprint, College Station: TexasA&M University Press, 1999. xiv + 238 pp. Illustrations, maps, bibliography, index.
$16.95 paper, ISBN 0-89096-911-6.)

Searching for Life: The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared Children ofArgentina. By Rita Arditti. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. xvi + 235 pp. 32 illustrations, appendixes, notes, bibliography, index. $50.00 cloth, ISBN 0-520-21113-8, $19.95 paper, ISBN 0-520-21570-2.)

Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana: Law and Public Affairs, from TR to
FDR. By J. Leonard Bates, foreword by Richard Lowitt. (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1999. xiv + 410 pp. Halftones, notes, bibliography, index.
$39.95 cloth, ISBN 0-252-02470-2.)
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A Scattered People: An American Family Moves West By Gerald W. McFarland.

(1985; reprint, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000. xxii + 280 pp. Halftones, illustrations,
notes, bibliography, index. $16'95 paper, ISBN 1-56663-297-8.)

Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Edited by
Steve J. Stern. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998. xiv + 534 pp.
Halftones, maps, charts, notes, bibliography, index. $64.95 cloth, ISBN 0-82232201-3, $21.95 paper, ISBN 0-8223-2217-X.)
A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American Conservation Movement By Mark W. T. Harvey, foreword by William Cronon. Weyerhaeuser
Environmental Classic Series. (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2000. xxviii + 368 pp. Halftones, 5 maps, notes, bibliography, index. $19.95
paper, ISBN 0-295-97932-1.)

Tito Puente and the Making of Latin Music. By Steven Loza. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999. xvi + 260 pp. 57 halftones, discography, bibliography, index. $59.95 cloth, ISBN 0-252-02332-3, $26,95 paper, ISBN 0-25206 77 8-9')

News Notes

People

The National Parks Service Long Distance Trails Group (Santa Fe) recently
appointed Aaron MaIn as historian and Steve Burns as Planner/Landscape
Architect for the Trail of Tears National Historic Trail. Mahr previously
served as historian and chief of resource management at Palo Alto Battlefield
National Historic Site in Texas, and as region coordinator for the Underground Railroad Network to Freedom Program. Burns has been involved in
NPS projects across the country and worked on the park staff of the Death
Valley National Monument, Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation
Area, and Mount Rainier National Park.
Jerry Thompson, dean of arts and sciences at Texas A&M International University, Laredo, beca~e the fifty-seventh Texas State Historical Association
president at the organization's lOsth annual meeting in Houston. Thompson
is a prolific author and regular contributor to the New Mexico Historical

Review.
Grants, Fellowships, and Awards

The National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) is accepting applications for 2002-2003 fellowships until 1 May 2001. For eligibility guidelines,
send an e-mail to fellowships@neh.gov, visit www.neh.gov/onebook/fellowships,html, or write to Fellowships, Division of Research Program, National
Endowment for the Humanities, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue N .W., Room 318,
Washington, D.C., 20506.
The Coalition for Western Women's History is soliciting nominations for the
eleventh annual Joan Jensen-Darlis Miller Prize for the best article published
in 2000 on the htstory ofwomen and gender in the trans-Mississippi West. Submissions must be scholarly articles published in the 2000 calendar year and
may include previously unpublished articles appearing in anthologies. The
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work must deal with the history of women and gender in the North American
West, including Mexico, Canada, Alaska, and Hawaii. Contact information:
Theresa Salazar, Curator, The Bancroft Collection: Western Americana, Chair,
Jensen-Miller Prize Cornmittee, The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, 94720-6000, or tsalazar@library.berkeley.edu. Submission deadline is 1May 2001. The award and cash prize of$250 will be presented
at the 2001 Western History Association Conference in San Diego, California.
The Sharlot Hall Museum, Prescott, Arizona, has announced a literary competition for the third annual Longan Award for Southwest Women Writers.
The $1,000 prize will be awarded to "a career-oriented, but modestly published woman whose body of work reflects her personal commitrnent to the
history, issues, or images of the old or new Southwest, or draws direct inspiration from the region." For submission requirements, write to the Longan
Award Committee, Sharlot Hall Museum, 415 W. Gurley Street, Prescott,
I\Z, 863°1. Application deadline is 30 June 2001.
Archives, Exhibits, and Historic Sites

House Joint Resolution 13, which would have led to the sale or lease of 145year-old Fort Stanton, was tabled and killed during a hearing before the New
Mexico House Voters and Elections Committee. State Representative William W. Fuller (Rep.) ofAlbuquerque introduced the bill. Dick Weber, president of Fort Stanton, Inc., a group seeking to preserve the fort, is supervising
a study on the best uses of the property.
The Sharlot Hall Museum Archives in Prescott, Arizona, has created an interface and graphical database for researching its historic map collection.
The museum is in the early stages of digitizing images of over four thousand
maps. Access their records at www.sharlot.org/archives.
Scholars and buffs of New Mexico history should check out the H-New
Mexico network, where academic and nonprofessional historians, writers,
artists, teachers, and state enthusiasts exchange iriformation, proposals, and
inquiries on-line. To subscribe to the network, send the following command
to listserv@h-net.msu.edu: sub H-NEWMEXICO your name, institution (example: sub H-NEWMEXICO Jane Smith, New Mexico State University).
Calendar of Events

19 April 2001: Autry Western History Workshop commences with William
Deverell's lecture, "Faint Lives: Images of an Empty West." Karen Merrill
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will present "Soil and Sovereignty: Westerners and the Politics of Natural
Resources" on 17 May, and Chris Gantner will speak on "The Many Wests
of Carey McWilliams" on 14 June. Those interested in attending or acquiring copies of the papers should write to Stephen Aron, Department of History, 6265 Bunche, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 90095-1473, or saron@ucla.edu.

May: The Colorado Historical Society's (CHS) 2000-2001 Selling the West
lecture series will conclude with JoAnn Levy, "They Saw the Elephant:

15

Women in the California Gold Rush." For ticket and location information,
call (303) 866-4686. Those interested in CHS membership should write to
the Colorado Historical Society, Membership Department, 1300 Broadway,
Denver, CO, 80203.
12-19

May: New Mexico Heritage Preservation Week. The New Mexico His-

toric Preservation Division's web site (http://museums.state.nm.us/hpd) features a complete listing of events and locations.
1-31

May: Frederick Hoxie will moderate a public discussion on teaching

American Indian history and culture; The forum will take place on the "History Matters" web site (http://historymatters.gmu.edu). Swanlund Professor
of History at the University of Illinois, Urbana/Champaign, Hoxie is a distinguished scholar of Native American history. "History Matters" is a gateway for
high school and college instructors and students of U.S. history survey
courses who wish to explore American history on the internet. The site provides numerous historical documents, an extensive annotated list of web
links, and a wide range ofteaching resources. The W. K. Kellogg Foundation
and National Endowment for the Humanities are sponsoring this prototype
created by the American Social History Project/Center for Media and Learning of the City University of New York and the Center for History and New
Media at George Mason University.
12-14

July: Gender on the Borderlands Conference. The program committee

is recruiting papers, panels, roundtables, and workshops that explore gender in
the SpanishlMexican/U.S. Borderlands. Proposals may focus on any period
and any gender-centered subject in the history ofthis region. Send an abstract

(250 words) and one-page vita for each participant to Antonia Castai'ieda,
Gender on the Borderlands Conference, St. Mary's University, One Camino
Santa Maria, Box 46, San Antonio, TX, 78228. Complete details are provided
on the conference web site, http://ats.stmarytx.edu/~bcllands/.

222 +

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 76, NUMBER 2

July: Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of Route 66 Celebration, Albuquerque.
For a schedule of events or information on other celebration sites, contact the

14-21

New Mexico Route 66 Association (505) 224-2802 or www.rt66nm.org.
28-29 July: Fort Union Trading Post Powwow commemorating the signing of .
the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty. For a schedule of events and other information, i
write to Friends of Fort Union/Fort Buford, 15550 Highway 18°4, Williston,
ND,58801.
9-12 August: Conference of the American Historical Association, Pacific
Coast Branch, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Lon Kurashige is the
contact person at the Department of History, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 9°089-0°34, (213) 74°-1657 phone, (213) 740-6999 fax.

September: Rocky Mountain Interdisciplinary History Conference, Boulder, Colorado. Graduate students of the Department of History, University of

14-15

Colorado at Boulder, have designed this academic conference specifically for
graduate students in all disciplines to provide a congenial atmosphere for students
to present work, network with colleagues, gain experience in pubic speaking, and
attend workshops specifically tailored to graduate student interests. First-time
presenters are especially encouraged to participate. For submission guidelines
and conference schedules, visitwww.colorado.edu/ConferencesIRMIHC, send
an e-mail to RMIHC@ucsub.colorado.edu, or call (303) 492-5845.
28-30 September: Buffalo Bill Historical Center's Plains Indian Seminar, "Circles
of Knowledge: Plains Indian Education," Cody, Wyoming. Lillian Turner, Public Programs Coordinator for the Buffalo Bill Historical Center, is the contact
person at 720 Sheridan Avenue, Cody, WY, 82414, programs@bbhc.org, (307)
57 8-4028 .
18-21

October: Fifth Congress of the Americas, Puebla, Mexico. The program

chair is recruiting Spanish- and English-language papers related to Latin American, U.S., and comparative topics. Simultaneous translations via earpieces will
be available at plenary sessions. Submit 10o-word abstracts to Peter C. Rollins,
Program Chair, Popular Culture Center, RR 3 Box 80, Cleveland, OK, 74020,
by 1June. Visit the conference web site at www.udlap.mxIcOligress for additional
information.

4-7 October: Forty-First Annual Western History Association Conference, San
Diego, California. The conference theme is "The American West as Living
Space," and the program committee encourages panel and paper proposals that
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focus on "everything from federal land policy to western spaces." Submit proposal, one-page curriculum vita, and contact information to Professor David
Rich Lewis, Western Historical Quarterly, Utah State University, Logan, Utah,
84322-074°. The conference web site is www.unm.edu/~wha/confzoOl.hhll.

2-4 November: Mid-Atlantic Popular Culture Annual Conference, Silver
Spring, Maryland. Organizers welcome paper proposals on the theme, "Environment and Culture." Send one-page proposals (with curriculum vitae)
to James J. Donahue, University of Connecticut, Department of English,
Unit 1025, Storrs, CT, 06269. Deadline for submissions is 1June.
5-9 November: Sixth Biennial Conference of Research on the Colorado Plateau, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff. This conference will provide a
forum for research results and land-management issues related to the biological, paleontological, geological, cultural, physical, and social sciences on the
Colorado Plateau. Investigators who have conducted research relevant to the
Colorado Plateau are invited to submit an a~stract for a paper or poster presentation. Submissions must be received by 12 August to receive priority consideration and reduced registration fees. Conference details are posted at
www.usgs.nau.edu/6 th_biennial_conf/orcan be obtained from Mark K. Sogge,
USGS Forest and Rangeland Ecosystem Science Center, Colorado Plateau
Field Station, P.O. Box 5614, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff,AZ, 86011,
(520) 556-7311 ext. 232.

